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MCINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS
COMMISSION: PROTECTING THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR
DAMAGING THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS?
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the
right to freedom of speech.' From its beginning, the United States has
encouraged widespread discussion and debate over political issues affect-
ing the lives of all citizens and the future course of the country.2 Perhaps
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, ratified in 1791, provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277
(1964); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925). The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (noting the "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open") (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) and De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 365 (1937)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.").
Constitutional theorists often use the metaphor of a "marketplace of ideas" to link the
the First Amendment freedom of speech to mankind's "search for truth." RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIETY 6-8 (1992); see Stanley Ingber, The Market-
place of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-7 (1984). Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes embraced the marketplace of ideas theory in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes argued
that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market." Id. According to the marketplace of ideas theory, the clash of com-
peting ideas through a process of vigorous, uninhibited debate will lead to the discovery of
truth and distinguish truth from falsehood. See Ingber, supra, at 3, 6-7. As Rodney Smolla
noted, "When conflicting dogmas offer themselves to the market as truth, the modem
mind is most comfortable subjecting each to the intellectual acid bath of adversarial con-
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the single most important forum for the exercise of this freedom of ex-
pression is the electoral process.3 The freedom to engage in campaign-
related speech and to express opinions on political issues furthers our
system of participatory democracy.4 In this way, free speech is inextrica-
bly linked with our American system of self-governance. 5
Although the importance of protecting an individual's freedom of
speech during a political campaign is clear, the United States Congress
and nearly all state legislatures have determined that some regulations on
campaign-related expression are necessary to maintain the integrity of
the electoral process.6 Indeed, by 1995, forty-nine states and the District
of Columbia had passed statutes prohibiting the distribution of anony-
mous campaign literature-literature that does not contain the name of
test, for our intuition and experience reveal that truth may lie somewhere between them."
SMOLLA, supra, at 8.
Proponents of this theory emphasize that the search for truth in the marketplace of ideas
impacts the political process of our nation. See Ingber, supra, at 3-4, 8-12. Allowing a
multitude of ideas to compete in the marketplace fosters a well-informed electorate that
will make sound voting decisions and, thereby, enhance the quality of democratic govern-
ment. See id. Critics of the marketplace theory, on the other hand, contend that govern-
ment must regulate the marketplace of ideas to correct market failures caused by real
world conditions. See id. at 5; SMOLLA, supra, at 6-7. Alternatively, some critics disagree
conceptually with the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor and prefer the metaphor of a
"town meeting" run by a moderator. SMOLLA, supra, at 221. Thus, the town meeting the-
ory permits more regulation of speech than the marketplace theory. See id.
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution."); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971) ("[The First Amendment's] constitutional guarantee has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."); Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major pur-
pose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
4. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 3-17 (exploring the relationship between
free speech and an "open culture").
5. See id. at 12-13. Smolla argues that free speech is related to self-governance in five
ways: (1) as a vehicle for political participation; (2) as a tool in the "pursuit of political
truth;" (3) as a facilitator of majority rule; (4) as a "restraint on tyranny, corruption, and
ineptitude;" (5) as a protector of stability. Id.
6. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1520 (1995) (acknowleg-
ing that the Ohio Election Code prohibits making or disseminating false statements in
election campaigns because "false statements ... may have serious adverse consequences
for the public at large"); see also id. at 1532-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the history of
statutes requiring identification of an author or a sponsor's name on campaign-related
literature); Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amend-
ment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 144 (1995) (observing that statutes requiring identification of
an author or a sponsor's name on campaign-related literature have been passed for the
purpose of deterring fraud in the electoral process and providing information to voters);
Note, Gutter Politics and the First Amendment, 6 VAL. U. L. REv. 185, 198 (1972) (explain-
ing that disclosure statutes are designed to prevent " 'gutter flyers' ").
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the person or candidate sponsoring it. 7 Despite wide public support for
7. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1533 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing all of the
disclosure statutes in effect in 1995). In 1995, there were 49 state disclosure statutes in
effect. See ALA. CODE § 17-22A-13 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (Michie 1988) (cur-
rent version at ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.014 (Michie 1996)); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-912
(West Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (Michie 1993), amended by 1995 Ark. Acts
497 and 1085; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-108 (1980 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-333w (West 1989 & Supp. 1994), repealed and replaced by 1995 Conn. Acts 188, § 4,
and 276, § 2 (Reg. Sess.), and further amended by 1996 Conn. Acts 119, § 13 (Reg. Sess.);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 8021, 8023 (1993); FLA. STAT. chs. 106.143, 106.1437 (1993);
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-415 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-215 (1993), amended by 1995
Haw. Sess. Laws 10, § 2; IDAHO CODE § 67-6614A (1989 & Supp. 1994); 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/29-14 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-9-3-2; 3-14-1-3; 3-14-1-4 (Michie 1993),
amended by 1995 Ind. Acts 134 (amending § 3-14-1-4 only); IowA CODE § 56.14 (1991),
amended by 1995 Iowa Acts 2062; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2407, 25-4156 (1993); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 121.190 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1994), amended by 1996 Ky. Acts 153, § 8; LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994), amended by 1995 La. Acts 300, § 1;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1014 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994), amended by 1995 Me.
Laws 483, § 6; MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26-17 (1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, §§ 39, 41
(1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.247 (West 1989), amended by 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts
225, § 1; MINN. STAT. § 211B.04 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-899 (1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 130.031 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-225 (1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 49-1474.01 (1993), amended by 1995 Neb. Laws 399, § 3; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 294A.320 (Michie 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:14 (Supp. 1994), amended by
1996 N.H. Laws 88, §§ 6-7; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-38.1 (West 1989), repealed by 1995 N.J.
Laws 391, § 4; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-16, 1-19-17 (Michie 1991); N.Y. EI.c. LAW § 14-
106 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (1991 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CEr. CODE
§ 16.1-10-04.1 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1988), amended by
1995 Ohio Laws 146; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1840 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.522 (1993);
25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3258 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-23-2 (1988); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 8-13-1354 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993), amended by 1995 S.C. Acts 6, § 43; S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 12-25-4.1 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-120 (1994);
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.001 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-24 (Supp.
1994), repealed by 1995 Utah Laws ch. 1, § 88; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2022 (1982); VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-1014 (Michie 1993), amended by 1996 Va. Acts ch. 1042; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.17.510 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994), amended by 1995 Wash. Laws 397, § 19;
W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (1994), amended by 1995 W. Va. Acts 101; Wis. STAT. § 11.30
(1991-1992); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110 (Michie 1992), amended by 1996 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 93, § 1. The District of Columbia also had a disclosure statute. See D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1420 (1992). In addition, federal law required disclosure of the name of "any person
making an expenditure for the purpose of financing political communications expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1994).
California also had enacted a statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature, but it
was repealed after a state court declared it to be unconstitutional. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct.
at 1533 n.3 (citing Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Schuster, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981)).
Disclosure statutes generally apply to all campaign literature, whether it is distributed by
official campaign organizations or by individual citizens who are unconnected with any
campaign. See King, supra note 6, at 144-45. Most of the statutes apply to both literature
advocating the election of a candidate and literature arguing in favor of a ballot issue. See
id. & n.4; McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514 n.3. Although most state disclosure statutes are very
similar, there are distinctions among them. See King, supra note 6, at 145-46. For exam-
ple, some statutes only require disclosure for literature making derogatory references to a
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laws of this nature' and their long history in the United States,9 the
United States Supreme Court held in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Com-
mission1" that such laws are an unconstitutional infringement on the free-
dom of speech."
In 1988, Mrs. Margaret McIntyre, of Westerville, Ohio, distributed leaf-
lets to attendees at a meeting regarding a proposed school tax levy.' 2
Mrs. McIntyre made the leaflets on her home computer and passed them
out to express her opposition to the tax levy.' 3 Only some of the leaflets
candidate. See, e.g., id. at 145-46 (discussing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1463 (West 1996));
Steven Robert Daniels, Survey of Developments, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1618, 1618 (1994) (dis-
cussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-247 (1987)).
8. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1532-33 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the wide-
spread acceptance of disclosure statutes and listing the 49 state disclosure statutes in effect
in 1995, as well as the District of Columbia statute, and the federal statute). In highlighting
the history of the widespread disclosure statutes, Justice Scalia referred to approval of the
statutes as "universal." Id. at 1533.
9. The first American disclosure statute was enacted in Massachusetts in 1890. See
id. The Ohio statute was adopted in 1915. See id. at 1532. By World War I, 24 states had
disclosure statutes, and by 1995,49 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal govern-
ment all had such statutes. See id. at 1533.
10. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
11. See id. at 1524.
12. See id. at 1514. The leaflets read as follows:
VOTE NO
ISSUE 19 SCHOOL TAX LEVY
Last election Westerville Schools, asked us to vote yes for new building and
expansions [sic] programs. We gave them what they asked. We knew there was
[sic] crowded conditions and new growth in the district.
Now we find out there is a 4 million dollar deficit-WHY?
We are told the 3 middle schools must be split because of over-crowding, and
yet we are told 3 schools are being closed-WHY?
A magnet school is not a full operating school, but a specials [sic] school.
Residents were asked to work on a 20 member commission to help formulate
the new boundaries. For 4 weeks they worked long and hard and came up with a
very workable plan. Their plan was totally disregarded-WHY?
WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. Our children's education and
welfare must come first. WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE TOLERATED.
PLEASE VOTE NO
ISSUE 19
THANK YOU.
CONCERNED PARENTS
AND
TAX PAYERS
Id. at n.2.
13. See id. at 1514. Although Mrs. McIntyre designed the leaflets on her computer,
she paid to have them professionally photocopied. See id.
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included her name as the author; others were signed, "CONCERNED
PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS."' 4
Five months later, Westerville school officials filed a complaint with
the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that Mrs. McIntyre violated
§ 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code, which prohibited the dissemination of
anonymous campaign literature."5 The Elections Commission fined Mrs.
McIntyre one hundred dollars.' 6 The Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
Mrs. McIntyre's conduct. 7 By a divided vote, the Ohio Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court and reinstated the fine. 8 The Ohio Supreme
Court, again by a divided vote, affirmed and upheld the statute. 19 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, however, and held that the Ohio
statute banning anonymous campaign literature was unconstitutional.20
14. Id. "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers" was a fictitious organization. See Brief
of Respondent at 1, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (No. 93-
986). Mrs. McIntyre later swore under oath to the Ohio Elections Commission that she
thought she had put her name and address on all of the flyers. See Mary Deibel, High
Court to Decide Rights of Pamphleteers, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 10, 1994, at 5-B
(discussing the history of the McIntyre case).
15. See McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1514 & n.3. Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised
Code provided:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written, printed,
posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or
any other form of general publication which is designed to promote the nomina-
tion or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of
any issue, or to influence the voters in any election, or make an expenditure for
the purpose of financing political communications through newspapers,
magazines, outdoor advertising facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of
general public political advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or other nonperi-
odical printed matter, unless there appears on such form of publication in a con-
spicuous place or is contained within said statement the name and residence or
business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing
the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.
Id. (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)) (emphasis added).
16. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
17. See id. at 1515. The Common Pleas Court found Mrs. McIntyre had not attempted
to mislead the public with her flyers. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id The Ohio Supreme Court held that the identification statute violated
neither the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Article I of the Ohio
Constitution. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ohio 1993);
see also infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (discussing the holding and rationale of
the Ohio Supreme Court).
20. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524; see infra notes 107-45 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's analysis and holding in McIntyre).
The Court's decision to hear Mrs. McIntyre's case attracted a great deal of national
attention and drew prominent allies on both sides. See Deibel, supra note 14, at 5-B. The
National Conference of State Legislatures and the U.S. Conference of Mayors both ex-
pressed support for Ohio's statute, as did 27 other states with similar identification statutes
1997]
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This Note examines the right to distribute anonymous campaign litera-
ture. It begins by considering the history of First Amendment case law
stressing the value of anonymous speech and contrasts that with case law
highlighting the importance of disclosing an author's identity. Next, this
Note examines the conflict between the state's interests in regulating
speech and the individual's First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech. In doing so, this Note evaluates the two competing analytical
standards that have been used to review restrictions on campaign-related
speech. This Note then considers the varied judicial treatment of anony-
mous campaign literature by lower courts. After dissecting the Supreme
Court's reasoning in McIntyre, this Note argues that the majority opinion
fails to fully consider Ohio's strong interests in preventing fraudulent
campaign-related statements and providing information to its electorate.
This Note then asserts that the majority opinion in McIntyre leaves unan-
swered questions about what type of identification statute might survive
judicial scrutiny. Finally, this Note concludes that the McIntyre decision
will hinder the ability of states to prevent fraudulent statements during
political campaigns and may lead to dangerous consequences for the elec-
toral process.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ELECTORAL SPEECH
A. The Link Between Anonymity and First Amendment Freedoms
The Supreme Court first recognized the value of anonymous political
speech in Talley v. California.21 In Talley, the petitioner distributed flyers
that filed amicus briefs with the Court. See id. at 8-B. The American Civil Liberties
Union, on the other hand, sponsored Mrs. McIntyre's suit. See Brian Doherty, Outlawing
the Federalist Papers: Can Free Speech be Anonymous Too?, REASON, Apr. 1995, at 14.
The oral arguments before the Supreme Court were very lively. See Keith C. Epstein,
Ohio Free Speech Case Shocks Supreme Court, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 13, 1994,
at 3-A. Justice O'Connor asked Assistant Ohio Attorney General Andrew Sutter whether
the State would have fined the authors of the Federalist Papers for writing anonymously, if
they were alive and writing in Ohio today. See id. Sutter responded that they would in-
deed be fined because the State has a compelling interest in requiring authors of political
literature to identify themselves. See id. Justice O'Connor remarked, " 'I would have
thought that if the First Amendment stood for anything at all it stands for my right to put
out a flier at a school board election on any issue I care about without identifying myself
.. I find it quite remarkable to say Ohio can totally ban this.' " Id. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor noted that voters may reject anonymous literature as unreliable: " 'I can always
say as a voter, 'it's anonymous, so I can toss it in the wastebasket.' ' " Id.
Noting that state representatives in the Ohio Legislature had passed the statute, Justice
Scalia asked Sutter, " '[C]an't we assume the people of Ohio like this law?'" Id. " 'Yes,' "
replied Sutter. Id. Justice Ginsburg's comment, "'I'll bet most people in Ohio don't even
know about the existence of this law,' " however, caused a stir of laughter from several
Justices. Id.
21. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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urging readers to boycott certain merchants."2 The flyers displayed mini-
mal identifying information. 3 Following the distribution, the petitioner
was convicted of violating a Los Angeles City ordinance that prohibited
all anonymous leafletting.24 The Municipal Court convicted the peti-
tioner because the identifying information provided on the flyer was in-
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance.2 5 In affirming the
conviction, the appeals court rejected the petitioner's contention that the
ordinance violated his freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
26
When the petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the
City of Los Angeles argued that the ordinance was justified because it
was designed to identify proponents of fraud, false advertising, and li-
bel.27 The Court rejected Los Angeles's argument, however, because the
text of the ordinance did not indicate that the anonymous leaflet ban was
limited to the purpose of identifying such offenders.2 8 Moreover, the
Court noted that Los Angeles failed to proffer any legislative history indi-
cating such a limited purpose for the ordinance. 9
After determining that the goal of the ordinance was not to identify
people distributing fraudulent leaflets, the Talley Court explicitly stated
that its decision did not encompass anonymous leafletting ordinances that
were limited to the purpose of preventing fraud, false advertising,
22. See id. at 61. According to the flyers, the merchants carried products made by
manufacturers who did not provide equal employment opportunites to members of minor-
ity groups. See id. In addition, the flyers stated: "'I believe that every man should have an
equal opportunity for employment no matter what his race, religion, or place of birth."' Id.
23. See id. The only identification provided was: "National Consumers Mobilization,
Box 6533, Los Angeles 55, Calif., PLeasant [sic] 9-1576." Id. The flyers also included a
blank space for readers to register as members of the National Consumers Mobilization
organization. See id.
24. See id. at 60-62. The ordinance stated:
No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances,
which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and
address of the following: (a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manu-
factured the same; (b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; pro-
vided, however, that in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such
fictitious name, the true names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents
of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear thereon.
Id. at 60-61.
25. See id. at 61. Although the flyers included the organization's name, "National
Consumers Mobilization," they did not include the names and addresses of the group's
leaders. Id.
26. See id. at 61-62.
27. See id. at 64.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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or libel.3" Rather, the Court emphasized that it was ruling on an
ordinance that completely banned all anonymous leaflets under any cir-
cumstances 31 and, therefore, unconstitutionally restricted freedom of
expression.32
The Talley Court then went on to discuss the long history of anony-
mous speech and the value of using anonymity for constructive purposes,
30. See id.
31. See id. The Court relied on the precedents set by Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943). See Talley, 362 U.S. at 62-62.
In Lovell, the Supreme Court reviewed a city ordinance that prohibited the distribution
of "circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind," without a permit issued by
the City Manager. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 447. The petitioner was convicted of violating the
ordinance by distributing religious literature for the Jehovah's Witnesses. See id. at 447-48.
The Court determined that the ordinance was void on its face because it was overly broad
and prohibited the "distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in
any manner without a permit." Id. at 451. An ordinance such as this, explained the Court,
"strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and
censorship." Id.
In Schneider v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court examined four different city ordinances
prohibiting the distribution of leaflets in Irvington, New Jersey; Los Angeles, California;
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Worcester, Massachusetts. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 153-58.
Each of the municipalities attempted to justify its ordinance, and distinguish it from the
one invalidated in Lovell, by arguing that its ordinance was aimed at regulating the use of
public streets, ensuring public safety, preventing litter in the streets, and regulating solicita-
tion of city residents. See id. at 154-62.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the ordinances were invalid, citing the Lovell Court's
statement that publicly distributed pamphlets are "historical weapons in the defense of
liberty." Id. at 161-62. The Court concluded that municipalities could enact ordinances
regulating the conduct of people on the streets, in order to protect "public safety, health,
welfare or convenience," as long as the regulations do not abridge freedom of speech or
press. Id. at 160. The goal of keeping streets free of litter, the Court explained, is insuffi-
cient to justify a city regulation that prohibits the distribution of literature and, thus, bur-
dens the freedom of speech. See id. at 162. "Any burden imposed upon the city
authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distri-
bution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press." Id.
Finally, in Jamison v. Texas, the Court reversed the conviction of another member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses who distributed handbills in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting
such activity. See 318 U.S. at 413-14. Although acknowledging that a state may regulate
travel on its streets to protect public safety, the Court held that the city ordinance violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution because individuals have a right
to freedom of speech on public streets. See id. at 414-16. Based on the reasoning of
Lovell, Schneider, and Jamison, the Talley Court determined that Los Angeles's ordinance
was overly broad and, therefore, violated the constitutional right to freedom of speech.
See Talley, 362 U.S. at 62-65.
32. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65. The Court reasoned that an identification require-
ment for leaflets restricts the freedom to distribute literature and, thus, also restricts over-
all freedom of expression. See id. at 64. Citing Lovell, the Court explained that the
freedom to distribute and publish information is an essential element of the freedom of
expression guarantee because " 'without the circulation, the publication would be of little
value.' " See id. (quoting Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452).
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such as criticizing oppressive governments, suggesting political alterna-
tives, or arguing for the adoption of a new Constitution.33 Finally, the
Court referred to two earlier opinions holding that states could not force
certain groups that circulated information to release their membership
lists. 34 In those cases, the Court stressed that identifying members of a
group might cause the members to fear retaliation by others and, thus,
discontinue their involvement in the discussion of important public is-
sues.35 Following this rationale, the Talley Court reasoned that the Los
33. See id. at 64-65. The Court's opinion noted that many persecuted groups wishing
to criticize their oppressors have had to do so anonymously in order to avoid retaliation.
See id. For example, colonial patriots frequently wrote literature anonymously to avoid
prosecution by the British. See id. The Court also emphasized that the Federalist Papers
were published under fictitious names. See id. at 65.
34. See id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960)).
35. See id. at 65. During the Civil Rights Movement, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was very active in Alabama, recruiting new
members, providing legal assistance to Black students pursuing admission to Alabama's
state university, and supporting a boycott of the Montgomery bus lines. See Patterson, 357
U.S. at 452. Patterson arose after the NAACP, a New York nonprofit corporation, failed to
comply with an Alabama statute requiring foreign corporations to qualify to do business
within the State by filing their corporate charters with the Secretary of State. See id. at
451. The NAACP did not comply with the qualification statute because it considered itself
exempt. See id. at 452. After John Patterson, the Alabama Attorney General, filed suit to
enjoin the NAACP from conducting further activities within the State, an Alabama court
issued an order requiring the NAACP to produce certain documents, including its mem-
bership lists. See id. at 452-53. Although the NAACP provided most of the requested
data, it refused to turn over its membership lists and was adjudged in civil contempt and
fined for failing to comply with the court order. See id. at 454.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that compulsory disclosure of the
membership lists would be a restraint on the NAACP members' right to freedom of associ-
ation. See id. at 466. The Court explained that advocacy of an individual's beliefs and
ideas is enhanced by group association and, therefore, freedom of association is linked to
freedom of speech. See id. at 460 (citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). The Court also explained that the freedoms
of association, and of speech, are both aspects of the "liberty" protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Drawing a link between an individual's
privacy and freedom of association, the Court stressed that protection of privacy in group
association is necessary for the preservation of the freedom of association, especially when
an individual is a member of a group espousing unpopular beliefs. See id. at 462.
The Court noted that NAACP members whose identity had been revealed were exposed
to "economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifes-
tations of public hostility." Id. Thus, the Court worried that releasing the names of the
NAACP members might prompt members to withdraw from the organization or dissuade
others from joining the group, in fear of these consequences. See id. at 462-63. Finally, the
Court considered whether Alabama's reasons for requesting the membership lists were
sufficient to justify the chilling effect that the disclosure would have on the exercise of the
NAACP members' freedom of association. See id. The Alabama Attorney General ar-
gued that the State needed the membership lists to determine whether the NAACP was
conducting business in violation of the State's foreign corporation registration statute. See
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Angeles ordinance might have the same chilling effect; therefore, the
Court found the ordinance invalid.36
B. The Importance of Disclosing an Author's Identity
Although the Supreme Court has found anonymity necessary in some
circumstances, the Court also has discussed the value of disclosing an au-
id. at 464. The Court concluded that because disclosure of the membership lists would not
substantially further the State's determination of this matter, the deterrent effect it would
have was not justified. See id. at 464-65.
Two years later, the Supreme Court examined the same issue in Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. at 517. Bates involved a license tax upon businesses within the city limits of
Little Rock and North Little Rock, Arkansas. See id. Although charitable organizations
were exempt from paying the tax, they still were required to submit certain information to
the city. See id. at 518. The information required included the name and purpose of the
organization, along with a copy of its financial statement listing the amount of dues paid
and the names of people who paid those dues. See id. at 517-18 & n.3. All of the informa-
tion provided was to be public and subject to inspection by any interested party. See id. at
518. The custodians of records of the Little Rock and North Little Rock chapters of the
NAACP supplied the city officials with all of the requested information except the names
of their members. See id. at 519-21. The NAACP chapters explained to the city officials
that they were not providing the membership lists because of the anti-NAACP climate in
Arkansas and because they feared that public disclosure of the members' names "might
lead to their harassment, economic reprisals, and even bodily harm." Id. at 520-21. In
addition, the NAACP asserted the right of its members to participate anonymously in the
activities of the NAACP and argued that the city was not authorized, under either the
United States or Arkansas Constitutions, to request such information. See id. During the
NAACP chapters' trials for violation of these ordinances, evidence was submitted that for-
mer members of the NAACP had chosen not to renew their memberships because they
feared that their names would be made public. See id. at 521. Additional evidence showed
that NAACP members who had been publicly identified had been harassed and physically
threatened. See id. at 522. Despite this evidence, the records custodians of both NAACP
chapters were convicted of violating the ordinances, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed the convictions. See id. at 521-22.
Citing Patterson, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the freedom of asso-
ciation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause from invasion by
the states. See id. at 522-23 (citing Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460). The Court explained that
mandatory disclosure of the local NAACP membership lists would be a restraint on the
members' freedom of association. See id. at 523. In such cases, the State would be justified
in requesting the membership lists only if it could demonstrate a compelling state interest
in the lists and show that the requested action "bears a reasonable relationship to the
achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification." Id. at 524-25. The
Court determined that there was no correlation between the cities' power to impose a
license tax and the compulsory disclosure of the membership lists because no showing had
been made that the organizations were engaged in an occupation for which a license was
required. See id. at 525-27. Thus, the Court reversed the convictions. See id. at 527.
36. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. The Los Angeles ordinance could have a chilling effect on
speech because citizens who feared reprisal might choose not to distribute flyers if they
were required to include their name and address on the flyers. See id.
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thor's identity. 37 In Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan ,38 the Court upheld
a federal law that required all newspapers and periodicals to publish the
names and addresses of their editors, publishers, and owners in order to
have certain mailing privileges.39 The Court held that the statute did not
violate the First Amendment because it did not deprive the publishers of
their right to use the mail system but, rather, impacted only their ability
to enjoy the privileges of the second-class mail system.4 °
37. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978) (noting, in part,
that the identification of an author may assist people in evaluating the author's argument);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, 72, 81-82 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding the
mandatory disclosure of the names of campaign contributors); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan,
229 U.S. 288, 296-97, 308-10, 312-13 (1913) (upholding a federal requirement that newspa-
pers release the names of their editors, publishers, and owners).
38. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
39. See id. at 296-97. The statute stated that any publication failing to comply with its
provisions would be "denied the privileges of the mail." Id. at 297.
40. See id. at 308-10, 312-13; see infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Lewis Publishing decision).
In Lewis Publishing, two newspaper publishers in New York City challenged the federal
disclosure statute, arguing that it abridged the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 229 U.S. at 297. The publishers contended that the statute was intended to
regulate journalism and control the freedom of the press, rather than regulate the postal
system. See id. at 297-98. Reviewing the statute's legislative history, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress has the power to classify the mail into different categories and set
different mailing rates for each category. See id. at 301-02. At the time the statute was
enacted, Congress had identified newspapers and periodicals as "second-class" material
and had entitled them to lower mailing rates to encourage the widespread " 'dissemination
of current intelligence.' " Id. at 302-03. Additionally, the Court explained that the Con-
gress has the power to set the standards which publishers must meet in order to qualify for
the beneficial, reduced mailing rates. See id. at 302. The Court explained that setting
standards, such as the disclosure requirement, for receiving the privilege of reduced mail-
ing rates was essential since the reduced rates represented a windfall for the publication
and a loss for the Postal Service. See id at 312-13.
The Court further noted that the publication of the names of the editors, publishers, and
owners would make the public aware of the people and organizations controlling the publi-
cation and alert them to the particular interests the newspaper represented. See id. at 312.
The Court cited the statute's legislative history, which stated:
[S]ince the general public bears a large portion of the expense of distribution of
second-class matter, and since these publications wield a large influence because
of their special concessions in the mails, it is not only equitable but highly desira-
ble that the public should know the individuals who own or control them.
Id.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the publishers' contention that failure to comply with
the statute would deprive a publishing company of its right to use the mail system gener-
ally. See id. at 308. Rather, the Court determined that failure to comply with the statute
would only deprive the publishing company of the right to enjoy the privileges of the re-
duced second-class postage rate. See id. Thus, the Court regarded the statute as a supple-
ment to the existing postal legislation concerning second-class mail, rather than a
restriction on the freedom of the press and the right to use the mail system. See id. at 312-
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Decades later, in Buckley v. Valeo ,41 the Court reviewed various provi-
sions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.42 The statute re-
stricted individual contributions to a political campaign 43 and mandated
that contributions above a certain amount be reported and publicly
disclosed."
41. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
42. See id. at 6. A group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute and
sought an injunction against its enforcement. See id. at 8-9. The plaintiffs included a can-
didate for the U.S. Presidency, a U.S. Senator running for re-election, a potential financial
contributor, and several political action committees. See id. at 7-8.
43. See id. at 7. The statute limited individuals to an annual total of $25,000 in overall
contributions and $1,000 for any one candidate per election. See id Additionally, the
statute limited the overall amount that candidates for federal offices could spend on their
own election campaigns and restricted the candidates' use of their own personal money in
their campaigns. See id. at 7, 13.
The plaintiffs argued that limiting the amount of money a person could spend for polit-
ical purposes violated the First Amendment freedoms of speech and political association
because "virtually all meaningful political communications in the modem setting involve
the expenditure of money." Id. at 11. In reviewing the $1,000 limit on individual contribu-
tions, the Supreme Court applied an exacting scrutiny standard of review. See id. at 25.
The Court acknowledged that the $1,000 limit burdened the contributor's freedoms of
speech and association. See id. Nonetheless, the Court determined that the federal gov-
ernment's interest in preventing corruption, or the appearance of corruption, that may
result from large financial contributions made to obtain a political quid pro quo from an
elected official, was sufficient justification for the restriction. See id. at 29. The Court also
upheld the annual $25,000 limit as a corrollary to the individual $1,000 limit, reasoning that
it prevented people from evading the $1,000 limit by contributing massive amounts of
money to political committees or parties which might donate the money to a particular
candidate. See id. at 38.
Conversely, the Court found that other parts of the statute were unconstitutional. See
id. at 52-54. The Court held that the statute's limitation on the amount of personal money
a candidate could spend on his or her own campaign was unconstitutional because it re-
strained the candidate's First Amendment freedom of expression. See id. at 52-54. The
Court noted that the governmental interest in preventing corruption was not implicated by
a candidate's expenditure of his or her own money. See id. at 53. Similarly, the Court also
determined that the overall limitation on campaign expenditures, from any source, was
unconstitutional because it restricted political expression; therefore, no governmental in-
terest was sufficient to justify the restriction. See id. at 54-58.
44. See id. at 7. The reporting and disclosure requirements of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 mandated that political committees maintain detailed records of
contributions and expenditures, including the name and address of people who contributed
more than $10, as well as the date and amount of their contribution. See id. at 63. The
statute also required that if a person's overall contributions totaled more than $100, his or
her occupation and principal place of business had to be included in the records. See id. In
addition, the statute required political committees and candidates to file quarterly reports
with the Federal Elections Commission detailing their campaign-related financial informa-
tion, including the name, address, occupation, and place of business of each person who
contributed more than $100 per year, and the date and amount of the contributions. See
id. Moreover, these reports were to be made available to the public for review. See id.
Individuals or groups, other than political committees or candidates, also were required to
file statements with the Federal Elections Commission if they made contributions or in-
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In one section of its extensive opinion, the Buckley Court examined the
reporting and disclosure requirements of the statute.45 The Court noted
that compelled disclosure, such as that mandated by the statute, infringed
on the First Amendment privacy of association and that "significant en-
croachments on First Amendment rights ... cannot be justified by a mere
showing of some legitimate governmental interest."46 Rather, the Court
stated that the state's interests must pass the test of "exacting scrutiny.",
47
Applying the test to the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Buckley
Court found that the asserted governmental interests outweighed any
possible infringement on First Amendment freedoms.48 The governmen-
tal interests included providing information to the voting public regarding
political campaign money.49 The Court determined that disclosure gave
dependent expenditures greater than $100 in a year, by means other than contributing to a
committee or candidate. See id. at 63-64.
The plaintiffs in Buckley argued that these reporting and disclosure requirements vio-
lated their rights to freedom of association and were overbroad because they applied to
independent and minor-party candidates. See id. at 11, 61. The plaintiffs contended that
the governmental interest in disclosure was slight because independent and third-party
candidates have very little chance of winning. See id. at 70. The plaintiffs also questioned
the statute's application to independent contributions and expenditures, arguing that the
statute infringed on the privacy of association rights of individuals. See id. at 61, 75.
45. See id at 60-84.
46. Id. at 64 (citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). In Bates and Patterson, the Supreme Court
held that compelled disclosure of NAACP membership lists would be a restraint on the
exercise of the NAACP members' right to freedom of association. Bates, 361 U.S. at 523;
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462-63. In both cases, the Court stressed that the protection of a
person's privacy in group association is necessary to the preservation of her freedom of
association. Bates, 361 U.S. at 523; Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462; see supra note 35 (discussing
the Bates and Patterson cases).
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. According to the Court, an exacting scrutiny standard was
necessary because mandatory disclosure of contribution and expenditure information
could potentially infringe on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 66. The
Court's use of an exacting scrutiny standard was derived from NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), discussed supra note 35, in which the Court explained that
the infringement on First Amendment freedoms caused by mandatory disclosure of the
names of NAACP members could only be justified if the state could show (1) a compelling
interest for the disclosure and (2) a reasonable relationship between the disclosure and the
governmental purpose it was intended to serve. See id. at 463-65; see also First Nat'l Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (applying a test of exacting scrutiny to review a restric-
tion on corporate speech); Bates, 361 U.S. at 524-25 (employing an exacting scrutiny stan-
dard to evaluate city ordinances that mandated the disclosure of NAACP membership
lists).
48. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
49. See id. at 66-67. In addition, the Court identifed two other governmental interests
served by the disclosure requirement. See id. at 67-68. The Court reasoned that disclosure
deters corruption by publicly revealing large contributions and expenditures. See id. at 67.
Disclosure and reporting also provide the data needed to detect violations of the statute's
financial contribution limitations. See id. 68.
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the electorate information about the source of candidates' political cam-
paign money, which would assist voters in evaluating the candidates.5"
Thus, the Court concluded that the public interest in disclosure out-
weighed the potential harm to First Amendment freedoms. 5'
Two years later, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,52 the Court consid-
ered a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited certain corporations
and businesses from making expenditures or contributions to express
their political views and, thereby, influence voters.53 The appellants were
banking associations and business corporations that wanted to publicize
their views concerning a proposed constitutional amendment appearing
on the ballot.54 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
statute was constitutional, reasoning that a corporation's First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech is restricted to issues materially affecting
its business, property, or assets.55
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that corporate
speech does not lose its First Amendment protection merely because the
50. See id. at 66-67 & n.77 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)). The Court
stated that the source of a candidate's funding is important because it indicates the issues
to which the candidate is "most likely to be responsive." Id. at 67; see infra notes 60-61
and accompanying text (explaining that citizens may consider the identity and credibility of
an advocate when evaluating the merits of an argument).
51. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72.
52. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
53. See id. at 767-68. The statute stated:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank.., shall directly or indirectly
give, pay, expend or contribute ... any money or other valuable thing for the
purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of any
person to public office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any
political party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to
the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or
assets of the corporation. No question submitted to the voters solely concerning
the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be
deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.
Id. at 768 n.2 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)) (emphasis
omitted).
The appellants argued that this statute violated the First Amendment, the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and provisions of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution. See id. at 770.
54. See id. at 769. The amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution would have au-
thorized the state legislature to impose a graduated personal income tax. See id. The
appellants opposed this amendment because they believed that it would lead to an unfa-
vorable tax climate for business corporations and, thus, discourage them from settling in
Massachusetts. See id. at 770, 770 n.4. The appellants also feared that the tax structure
would discourage business executives from moving to or working in Massachusetts. See id.
at 770 n.4.
55. See id. at 767; First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass.
1977).
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subject matter of the speech does not materially affect the corporation's
business or property.5 6 Using the exacting scrutiny test,57 the Court de-
termined that the statute was not justified by a compelling state interest.58
In analyzing this case, the Court also indicated that the identity of an
author is valuable information for the public to know.59 The Court com-
mented that citizens in a democracy must judge and evaluate opposing
arguments and, in doing so, may consider the "source and credibility of
the advocate. '60 Thus, Bellotti also supports the proposition that disclo-
sure of an author's identity may be useful to the public.61
C. The Conflict Between First Amendment Freedoms and the State's
Interests in Regulating Elections
1. Exacting Scrutiny
The Supreme Court used a test of exacting scrutiny in Bellotti to ex-
amine the constitutionality of a state-imposed restriction on speech.62
Noting that the statute directly prohibited speech pertaining to electoral
56. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. The Court determined that neither the First nor Four-
teenth Amendments supported the attorney general's claim that corporate speech is pro-
tected only when it concerns the corporation's business or property. See id. The Court
also noted that its commercial speech cases do not support the argument. See id. at 783.
Rather, the Court stressed that the First Amendment prohibits the government from limit-
ing the information disseminated to citizens and, thereby, extends beyond protecting the
freedoms of press and speech of individuals. See id. The Court explained that commercial
speech is constitutionally protected "because it furthers the societal interest in the 'free
flow of commercial information.' " Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
57. See id. at 786.
58. See id. at 795; see infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (explaining the Bellotti
Court's use of an exacting scrutiny analysis to review Massachusetts's proferred state
interests).
59. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92.
60. Id. at 791-92. In a footnote to this discussion, the Court noted:
Corporate advertising, unlike some methods of participation in political cam-
paigns, is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the source of advertising
may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evalu-
ate the arguments to which they are being subjected.
Id. at 792 n.32.
61. Id. at 791-92, 792 n.32. This footnote became an important part of the argument in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1522 (1995). Ohio used the foot-
note to draw an analogy between the identity of a corporate author in a political campaign
and the identity of an individual who distributes campaign literature. See id. at 1522-23; see
infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the Bellotti
Court's comment and footnote to the statute at issue in McIntyre).
62. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; see supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the
origin of an exacting scrutiny standard for free speech cases). The "exacting scrutiny" test
later became the basis for the Court's decision in McIntyre. See infra notes 119-23 and
accompanying text (discussing the exacting scrutiny standard used in McIntyre).
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issues, the Court determined that the State must show that (1) there was
a compelling interest for the restrictive statute63 and (2) the statute was
narrowly drawn to impact only that compelling state interest.64
In conducting its exacting scrutiny analysis of the statute, the Bellotti
Court found that neither of the two interests advanced by Massachusetts
justified the restriction on corporate speech.65 First, Massachusetts ar-
gued that it had an interest in supporting the active role of citizens in the
electoral process and maintaining their confidence in government.66 The
Court explained, however, that the First Amendment forbids a state from
restricting the speech of some segments of society to bolster the voice of
others.67 Thus, Massachusetts's interest in sustaining an active electorate
and maintaining voter confidence did not justify the prohibition on cor-
porate speech.68
Second, Massachusetts contended that it had an interest in protecting
the rights of shareholders who disagreed with the viewpoints espoused by
the corporation's management.69 The Supreme Court reasoned that
Massachusetts's asserted interest in protecting those shareholders was
nullified by provisions of the statute that were both underinclusive and
overinclusive.7 ° Consequently, the Court concluded that Massachusetts's
63. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (" '[T]he State may prevail only upon showing a subor-
dinating interest which is compelling ....... (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)))).
The Court noted that the burden is on the State to demonstrate a compelling interest. See
id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)).
64. See id. ("[Tlhe State must employ means 'closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment .... ") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
65. See id. at 787-88.
66. See id. at 787. Massachusetts contended that corporations were so wealthy and
powerful that their views would overpower other points of view, leading to a decreased
role for individuals in the political system and a decline in voter confidence. See id. at 787-
89.
67. See id. at 790-91 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)).
The Court noted that there was no evidence that corporations were overshadowing the
role of individual Massachusetts citizens or undermining the citizens' confidence in govern-
ment. See id. at 789-90. Additionally, the Court declared that citizens have the responsi-
bility of evaluating the merits of various arguments and, in doing so, could consider "the
source and credibility of the advocate" if this information is disclosed. Id. at 791-92; see
also supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of knowing the iden-
tity of a candidate's financial contributors).
68. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92.
69. See id. at 787.
70. See id. at 792-93. The Court described the statute as underinclusive because it
prohibited corporations from making expenditures of corporate resources to further a par-
ticular viewpoint for a referendum, while it simultaneously allowed corporations to lobby
representatives about legislation on the issue. See id. at 791 n.31, 792-93. Therefore, the
statute allowed the corporation to make expenditures related to legislation, but not to
ballot issues. See id. at 793.
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interest in protecting shareholders did not warrant the restriction on cor-
porate speech.71 Thus, because the statute in Bellotti was not justified by
any compelling state interest, it did not withstand exacting scrutiny analy-
sis, and the Court held that it was unconstitutional.72
2. The "Ordinary Litigation" Test
In Anderson v. Celebrezze,73 the Supreme Court used a different ana-
lytical framework to review an Ohio election provision requiring in-
dependent candidates to file a statement of candidacy and a nominating
petition seventy-five days before the primary election.74 The Anderson
Court recognized that early filing deadlines affect the First Amendment
rights of voters.75 Nevertheless, the Court held that a state may impose
some restrictions on candidates' access to the ballot without unconstitu-
tionally burdening voters' associational or voting rights. 76 According to
The Court described the statute as overinclusive because it prohibited corporations from
making expenditures to support or oppose a ballot issue even when the shareholders unan-
imously authorized such action. See id. at 794.
71. See id. at 795.
72. See id.
73. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
74. See id. at 782-83 & 783 n.1 (reviewing OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.25.7 (Ander-
son Supp. 1982)). The deadline for independent candidates to file their materials with the
Ohio Secretary of State was March 20, 1980, and the date of the primary election was June
3, 1980. See id. at 783 n.1. Failure to submit the statement and petition resulted in exclu-
sion from the November ballot. See id. at 783.
When John Anderson, an independent candidate for President of the United States, at-
tempted to file his statement of candidacy and nominating petition on May 16, 1980, the
Ohio Secretary of State, Anthony J. Celebrezze, refused to accept Anderson's documents
because he had missed the statutory deadlines. See id at 782-83. Anderson then filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, challenging the con-
stitutionality of the statute and arguing that it violated the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of association. See id. at 783. The district court agreed with Anderson and or-
dered his name placed on the ballot. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit later reversed, holding that the early filing deadline for independent candi-
dates was valid. See id. at 784-85.
Anderson also filed suits challenging early filing deadlines in Maine and Maryland, and
both the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals affirmed district court
rulings invalidating the early filing deadlines. See id. at 786. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to settle the split among circuits on the issue of early filing deadlines. See id.
75. See id. at 786-87. The Court's primary concern was the interest of voters who
wished to associate and work together to support Anderson's candidacy and viewpoints,
rather than Anderson's interests as a candidate. See id. at 806. The Court explained that
early filing deadlines restrict candidates' access to the ballot, thereby limiting the field of
candidates from which voters can choose. See id. at 786. In addition, ballot restrictions
burden voters' freedom of association because they deprive like-minded citizens of an op-
portunity to work together in support of a particular candidate. See id. at 787-88.
76. See id. at 788.
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the Court, regulating elections is necessary to ensure that the elections
are fair, honest, and orderly.77
The Anderson Court declared that the same analytical method used in
"ordinary litigation" must resolve the constitutional challenges to state
election laws.7" Under the ordinary litigation test, the interests of the
state in regulating elections are weighed against the potential injury to
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.79 Applying
the ordinary litigation balancing test to Ohio's early filing deadline,8" the
Court found that the early deadline significantly burdened the availability
of political opportunities for Ohio voters and potential candidates, as well
as their associational rights.81 Continuing its analysis, the Court evalu-
ated the three interests that Ohio identified as justifying the early filing
deadline: "voter education,8 2 equal treatment for partisan and independ-
77. See id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). The Anderson Court
noted that state election codes generally govern issues such as voter registration, candidate
eligibility, and voting processes and procedures. See id. Although these provisions affect
voting and associational rights, the Court determined that "the State's important regula-
tory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."
Id.
78. Id. at 789; see infra note 104 and accompanying text (pointing out that the Ohio
Supreme Court used the ordinary litigation test to evaluate Ohio's ban on anonymous
campaign literature).
79. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. The first step in the ordinary litigation test is to
consider the nature and extent of the injury to the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. See id. Next, the court must identify and evaluate the interests that the state
asserts to justify the burden on the plaintiff's rights. See id. The court must then balance
the competing interests to determine whether the challenged statute is constitutional. See
id.
80. See id. at 790-806.
81. See id. at 790-94. The Court explained that the early filing deadline forced in-
dependent candidates to enter the presidential election arena several months before the
major political parties have selected their own candidates. See id. at 790-91. If the filing
deadline was later in the year, independent candidates could enter the race representing
the viewpoints of voters who are dissatisfied with the major parties' candidates. See id. at
791. Thus, the Court determined that the early filing deadline burdened the First Amend-
ment freedom of association of independent candidates and voters because it limited their
opportunities to associate with each other in support of their viewpoints. See id. at 793-94.
82. Id. at 796. Ohio used the term "voter education" to refer to the process by which
the electorate learns about the qualifications and positions of candidates running for Presi-
dent so that they can make a well-informed and reasoned choice about which candidate to
support. See id. at 796-97. The State argued that the early filing deadline for independent
candidates served the interest of voter education because it prompted Ohio voters to pay
attention to the candidate. See id. at 798.
1997] Anonymous Campaign Literature
ent candidates, 83 and political stability."'  None of those interests, how-
ever, justified the burden placed on voters' First Amendment rights by
the early filing deadline. 5 Based on its findings using the ordinary litiga-
tion test, the Anderson Court held that the burdens the Ohio law im-
posed on the voters' freedom of choice and freedom of association
outweighed Ohio's "minimal interest" in imposing an early deadline. 6
83. Id. at 796. "Equal treatment for partisan and independent candidates" means
"treating all candidates alike." Id. at 799. The State argued that the early filing deadline
for independent candidates furthered this interest because it required independent candi-
dates to file their documents on the same day that partisan candidates were required to file
their materials in order to participate in the primary election. See id.
84. Id. at 796. Ohio explained that it had a strong interest in preventing damaging
intraparty feuding within either of the two major political parties, which could result when
a partisan candidate decides to withdraw from the party primary and run as an independ-
ent. See id. at 801. Ostensibly, an early filing deadline for independent candidates would
prevent partisan candidates from attempting to run as independents and, therefore, would
protect the State's political party structure. See id. The State stressed that Anderson's
decision to run as an independent candidate for President could splinter the Ohio Republi-
can party by drawing Republican activists away from the party to work for the Anderson
campaign. See id.
85. See id. at 796-806. The Court determined that Ohio's interest in voter education
did not justify the burden on First Amendment rights because the advent of nationwide
communication systems and the increased literacy of the electorate made it easier for vot-
ers to learn about candidates in a short period of time. See id. at 796-98.
The Court also determined that Ohio's early filing deadline did not serve the interest of
equal treatment for partisan and independent candidates. See id. at 799-801. The Court
noted that although partisan candidates running in the primary election were required to
declare their candidacy on the same day as independent candidates, the benefits and bur-
dens on each group were quite different. See id. at 799. For example, partisan candidates
who did not run in the primary election still would appear on the general election ballot in
November even if they did not declare their candidacy by the March deadline. See id. On
the other hand, independent candidates who missed the March deadline would not appear
on the November ballot. See id. Moreover, partisan candidates who meet the March
deadline and win the primary election enjoy the benefit of the support and assistance of
the major party organizations. See id. at 800. Independent candidates, on the other hand,
do not gain such organized and powerful support. See id.
Finally, the Court concluded that Ohio's interest in maintaining political stability by
preventing intraparty feuding did not justify imposing an early filing deadline on independ-
ent candidates. See id. at 801-06. The Court reasoned that Ohio's actual, unarticulated
interest was to protect the major political parties from external competition with independ-
ent candidates and concluded that the major parties should not monopolize the political
structure. See id. at 801-02.
86. Id. at 806.
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D.. Judicial Treatment of Anonymous Campaign Literature by
Lower Courts: Conflicting Decisions
Before the McIntyre decision, the Supreme Court had addressed issues
such as the value of anonymity,87 the importance of knowing an author's
identity,88 and the relationship between the state's interests and the free-
dom of speech,89 but the Court had not directly confronted the issue of
anonymous campaign literature. Consequently, there was no clear indi-
cation of the constitutional status of prohibitions on anonymous cam-
paign literature.
Due to this lack of clarity, state and federal courts throughout the na-
tion each had their own interpretation of how the Supreme Court's previ-
ous rulings applied to state identification statutes; therefore, the lower
courts reached different conclusions when reviewing bans on anonymous
campaign literature. 90 In several cases, courts concluded that identifica-
87. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex ret Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63
(1958).
88. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92, 792 n.32 (1978); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S.
288, 312 (1913).
89. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-89 (1983); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786-
87.
90. Compare Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 884 P.2d 116, 123 (Cal. 1994)
(upholding a prohibition on anonymous campaign literature by a candidate or candidate-
controlled committee in order to aid the electorate in making an informed voting decision),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995), and Canon v. Justice Court, 393 P.2d 428, 436 (Cal.
1964) (maintaining that the state interest in prohibiting anonymous campaign literature
outweighs a limitation on freedom of expression but striking down the statute for other
reasons), and State v. Freeman, 55 P.2d 362, 365 (Kan. 1936) (holding that a statute ban-
ning anonymous campaign publications does not offend the First Amendment), and
Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Ky. 1976) (upholding a statute requiring the
identification of the financial supporters of campaign literature), and State v. Babst, 135
N.E. 525, 526 (Ohio 1922) (upholding a state statute requiring identification of the author
of campaign literature because it was designed to minimize fraudulent campaign litera-
ture), and Commonwealth v. Acquaviva, 145 A.2d 407, 412 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959) (sus-
taining an identification requirement as a regulation designed to preserve the integrity of
the electoral process), and Commonwealth v. Evans, 40 A.2d 137, 138-39 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1945) (upholding an identification statute as a regulation designed to discourage "character
assassination" and to promote fair elections and clean campaigning), with Printing Indus. v.
Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801, 811 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (holding that a state's interest in disclosing
certain information on campaign literature was insufficient to justify a prohibition on anon-
ymous political speech), vacated, 422 U.S. 937 (1975), and Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp.
244, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (invalidating a state statute restricting anonymous political
speech because it violated the First Amendment), rev'd sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U.S. 103 (1969), and Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that California's identification statute was unconstitutionally over-
broad), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Schuster, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981), and People v.
Bongiorni, 23 Cal. Rptr. 565, 565-66 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1962) (invalidating a
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tion statutes burdened citizens' First Amendment freedom of speech but
were valid nonetheless. 91 The primary rationale in those cases was that
the state interests in facilitating the flow of information to the public and
maintaining the civility and integrity of the electoral process outweighed
the burden that identification requirements placed on the First Amend-
ment rights of citizens.92 In other cases, however, courts invalidated stat-
utes banning anonymous campaign speech as violations of the First
Amendment freedom of speech.93 These conflicting lower court deci-
statute requiring the name and address of the distributor of campaign literature), and State
v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (La. 1989) (invalidating an identification statute because
the State failed to provide a compelling interest), and State v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 866, 870-
71 (La. 1976) (invalidating an identification statute because it was not narrowly tailored to
advance the State's interest), and Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Mass.
1975) (striking down a prohibition on anonymous campaign literature as a violation of the
First Amendment rights of non-voters), and People v. Duryea, 354 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1974) (invalidating an overly broad identification statute), and State v. North
Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 733 (N.D. 1978) (holding that a statute banning
anonymous political advertisements violates the First Amendment); see also Thomas H.
Dupree, Jr., Comment, Exposing the Stealth Candidate: Disclosure Statutes After McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Commission, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 1211, 1219-22 (1996) (examining the
varying rationales of the lower court opinions).
91. See, e.g., Griset, 884 P.2d at 123 (upholding a statute prohibiting anonymous mass
mailings by candidates because it furthers the State's compelling interest in an informed
electorate); Freeman, 55 P.2d at 365 (upholding a ban on anonymous campaign speech and
arguing that voters are entitled to know who is responsible for a piece of campaign litera-
ture); Morefield, 540 S.W.2d at 874 (distinguishing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960),
and holding that a disclosure requirement was valid because it was designed to promote
honesty and fairness in campaigns); Babst, 135 N.E. at 526 (upholding the identification
requirement in order to fix responsibility on those who published fraudulent statements);
Acquaviva, 145 A.2d at 412 (sustaining the identification requirement as a regulation
designed to preserve the integrity of the electoral process); Evans, 40 A.2d at 138-39 (up-
holding the identification statute as a regulation designed to discourage "character assassi-
nation" and to promote fair elections and clean campaigning); cf. Canon, 393 P.2d at 436
(explaining that a ban on anonymous campaign literature is justified because the State's
interest in providing information to voters and preventing fraudulent literature outweighs
the citizens' interest in anonymous speech, but holding the statute to be unconstitutionally
discriminatory for other reasons).
92. See, e.g., Griset, 884 P.2d at 122-23; Canon, 393 P.2d at 436; Freeman, 55 P.2d at
365; Morefield, 540 S.W.2d at 874; Babst, 135 N.E. at 526; Acquaviva, 145 A.2d at 412;
Evans, 40 A.2d at 138-39.
93. See, e.g., Printing Indus., 382 F. Supp. at 811 (holding that the burdens placed on
freedom of speech by a statute requiring political advertisements to include the name and
address of the sponsor outweigh any compelling state interest in prohibiting anonymous
political speech); Zwickler, 290 F. Supp. at 258 (striking down a statute prohibiting anony-
mous political speech as a violation of the freedom of expression); Schuster, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 453 (holding that a ban on anonymous campaign literature was an unconstitutionally
overbroad restriction on the freedom of speech); Bongiorni, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66 (rely-
ing on Talley to invalidate a statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous cam-
paign leaflets); Burgess, 543 So. 2d at 1336 (relying on Talley to invalidate a statute that
prohibited certain anonymous political speech); Fulton, 337 So. 2d at 870-71 (invalidating a
statute prohibiting anonymous campaign-related expression because it was not narrowly
1997]
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sions demonstrated the lack of a coherent, nationwide framework for
evaluating disclosure statutes when McIntyre arose.
II. MCINTYRE V. OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION: PROTECTING THE
RIGHT TO DISTRIBUTE ANONYMOUS CAMPAIGN LITERATURE
A. The Ohio Supreme Court Decision: Upholding the Ohio Statute
Reasoning that the State's dual interests in providing information to
voters and preventing fraud and libel outweighed the burden on authors,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that § 3599.09(A), the Ohio identification
statute, did not violate the freedom of speech that both the United States
and Ohio Constitutions guaranteed.94 First, the Ohio Supreme Court
emphasized the Ohio Court of Appeals' reliance on State v. Babst,95 an
Ohio Supreme Court decision upholding the statutory predecessor to
§ 3599.09(A). 96 Although Mrs. McIntyre argued that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Talley superseded Babst, the court rejected
her argument.97 Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished the two
drawn to protect a compelling state interest); Dennis, 329 N.E.2d at 710 (invalidating a
statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature because it violated the precedent set in
Talley); Duryea, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 130 (holding that a statute prohibiting anonymous cam-
paign literature was invalid because it was not narrowly drawn to advance a compelling
state interest); North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d at 735-36 (relying on the Talley
decision to strike down a ban on anonymous political leaflets). See generally Thomas E.
Leggans, Casenote, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677 (1988) (providing an analysis of prior cases that
either upheld or invalidated disclosure statutes).
94. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ohio 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
95. 135 N.E. 525 (Ohio 1922).
96. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 153. The Ohio Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Babst in upholding the constitutionality of the Ohio identification statute. See id. Babst
concerned § 13343-1 of the Ohio General Code, which was the predecessor to
§ 3599.09(A), the identification statute at issue in McIntyre. See Babst, 135 N.E. at 525;
McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 153. There were no material differences between the two statutes.
See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 153.
In Babst, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the statutory ban on anonymous
campaign literature violated the Ohio Constitution's liberty of speech provision. See
Babst, 135 N.E. at 525. The Bill of Rights of the Ohio Constitution provides that: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech, or by the press." Id. (quoting OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11) (emphasis added). The
Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that freedom of speech is not an unlimited right because
the Ohio Constitution states that people may be held responsible for any abuse of that
right. See id. at 526. The court concluded that the statutory ban on anonymous campaign
literature was designed to prevent fraudulent, anonymous statements and, therefore, com-
ported with the language and intent of the Ohio Constitution. See id. at 525-26.
97. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 153-54. Mrs. McIntyre argued that Babst was not
controlling because the Supreme Court had subsequently addressed the issue of anony-
mous literature in Talley. See id. Talley held that an ordinance banning all anonymous
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cases, explaining that the purpose of the Talley ordinance was merely to
disclose the identity of a leaflet's author and was not limited to the pre-
vention of fraud.98 The Ohio statute, on the other hand, was designed to
identify individuals or groups distributing fraudulent campaign literature
in violation of §§ 3599.091(B) and 3599.092(B)(2) of the Ohio Election
Code.99
Next, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's acknowledgment in Bellotti that identification requirements may
sometimes be permissible for campaign-related speech.100 The court
found it significant that the United States Supreme Court implicitly sup-
ported an identification requirement in a case employing an exacting
scrutiny standard.' 01
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, rejected the exacting scrutiny stan-
dard used in Bellotti. °2 The court reasoned that subjecting all voting reg-
ulations to exacting scrutiny "would tie the hands of States seeking to
leaflets unconstitutionally burdened freedom of expression. See Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (discussing the reason-
ing used to invalidate the ordinance in Talley).
98. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154. The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the
Talley decision was not dispositive in this case and stressed the language the Talley Court
used to qualify its decision. See id. Notably, the Talley Court said that it was not deciding
on the validity of a statute that was limited to preventing "fraud, false advertising and
libel." Id. (quoting Talley, 362 U.S. at 64). Rather, the Talley Court explained that its
decision encompassed ordinances prohibiting "all handbills" not including the author's
name and address. See id. (quoting Talley, 362 U.S. at 64) (emphasis added). Thus, the
Talley opinion pertained to blanket prohibitions on anonymous leaflets, rather than restric-
tions designed to prevent fraud. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
99. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154. These provisions of the Ohio Election Code
"prohibit persons from making false statements during campaigns for public office and
ballot issues." Id.
100. See id. The court recalled the discussion and footnote in Bellotti in which the
Supreme Court stated that citizens could consider a document's source in evaluating the
merits of its argument. See id. (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92, 792
n.32 (1978)); see also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing footnote 32 of
Bellotti).
101. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155. The Bellotti Court required the State to show a
compelling interest to justify any restriction on First Amendment freedoms. Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 786. The fact that the Supreme Court approved of an identification requirement in
a case employing the very high standard of exacting scrutiny is significant because it im-
plies that such an identification requirement "would survive constitutional scrutiny." Mc-
Intyre, 618 N.E.2d at 156.
102. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155. Bellotti, and other cases, required that restric-
tions on speech be "narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest." Id.; see
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
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assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently." ' Instead,
the court adopted Anderson's more flexible ordinary litigation test.
10 4
Using that analytical framework, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the identification requirement was only a minor burden on freedom of
speech. 105 Moreover, the State's interests in identifying proponents of
fraud, false advertising, and libel and providing voters with additional in-
formation to evaluate the campaign literature's credibility outweighed
the minor burden the statute imposed.' °6
B. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion: Striking Down the
Ohio Statute
Determining that Ohio's interests did not outweigh the burden on First
Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Ohio Supreme Court.10 7 The majority opinion, written by
Justice Stevens,"°8 began by noting that an author's choice to remain
anonymous is an aspect of the First Amendment freedom of speech. 10 9
103. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155.
104. See id.; see supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the ordinary litigation
test of Anderson). The Anderson Court had explained that "reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions" on voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were justified by the
State's interest in protecting the "integrity and reliability of the electoral process." Ander-
son v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 & n.9 (1983).
105. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155-56. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that the
identification requirement restricted neither the content of the authors' campaign litera-
ture, nor their ability to distribute it. See id. at 155.
106. See id. at 155-56. The burden on authors of campaign literature, therefore, was
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and justified by important state interests. See id. at 156;
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 & n.9 (noting that states may impose election restrictions to
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process). The Ohio Supreme Court also
pointed out that regulations on electoral speech, which are based on the State's interest in
providing additional information to voters, were acknowledged in Bellotti as regulations
that would survive constitutional scrutiny. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 156.
107. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995). Mrs. McIn-
tyre died of cancer in May, 1994, before her case reached the Supreme Court, but her
family continued the case. See id. at 1516; Deibel, supra note 14, at 5-B. Although the
State of Ohio requested that the Supreme Court dismiss the case because of Mrs. McIn-
tyre's death, the Court refused to do so, showing great interest in the case. See id.
108. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined in the opinion. See id. at 1513. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a concurring
opinion. See id. at 1524.
109. See id. at 1516. The Court also commented that the benefit of having anonymous
writings "enter the marketplace of ideas" outweighs the advantages gained by mandatory
disclosure of the author's identity. Id.; see Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonym-
ity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1084 (1961) (noting that
some commentators argue that "disclosure of a source of argument is necessary to an hon-
est evaluation of its truth in the market place [sic] of ideas," while others contend that
disclosure deters free expression and defeats the goals of the First Amendment's market-
place of ideas); supra note 2 (explaining the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor).
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Referring to its earlier decision in Talley, the Court emphasized the long
tradition of anonymous speech in the United States and explained that
the freedom to remain anonymous extends to the political context. 110
Comparing the Ohio statute with the ordinance in Talley, the Court de-
termined that both laws were invalid for the same reason: neither law
contained language limiting its purpose to preventing fraudulent or false
statements."' Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that Talley did not
necessarily control the decision in McIntyre because the Talley ordinance
prohibited all anonymous handbills, and the statute in McIntyre applied
only to campaign literature." 2 Thus, the Court narrowed the issue in Mc-
Intyre to whether the First Amendment's protection of anonymous
speech encompasses campaign literature. 1'3
Next, the Court considered the applicable level of scrutiny to be ap-
plied." 4 Ohio had argued that its statute was a provision of the election
code that the Court should review using the same analytical process as in
other election-code cases."15 In Anderson and other election-code cases,
the Court had used an ordinary litigation balancing test in which the
state's interests are weighed against the potential injury to citizens' First
Amendment rights." 6 The McIntyre Court determined that the ordinary
litigation test did not apply, however, because Ohio's statute did not
110. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516-17 (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65
(1960)); see supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting some historical examples of
anonymous speech in the United States). The Court noted that the Talley decision incor-
porated the respected tradition of anonymous political speech. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at
1517.
111. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517; supra text accompanying notes 27-29 (explaining
that the Talley Court had rejected Los Angeles's claim that the ordinance at issue was
designed to prevent fraud and libel because neither the text, nor the legislative history of
the ordinance, limited its scope to that purpose). The Court also pointed out that the Ohio
statute even applied when no fraudulent statements were included in the literature, as in
Mrs. McIntyre's case. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517.
112. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517.
113. See id. at 1518. Compare id. (narrowing the issue in the case to campaign litera-
ture), with Talley, 362 U.S. at 60 (identifying the issue in the case as whether a complete
ban on all anonymous handbills violates the First Amendment's freedom of speech).
114. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.
115. See id.
116. See id.; supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the steps of the ordinary
litigation test used in Anderson); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 441-42
(1992) (using an ordinary litigation test to uphold Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting);
Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 213-14, 229 (1986) (using an ordinary litigation
test to invalidate Connecticut's closed primary law); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
789, 806 (1983) (using an ordinary litigation test to invalidate Ohio's early filing deadline
for independent presidential candidates); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 736 (1974)
(noting that there is no "litmus-paper test" for evaluating election laws and upholding Cali-
fornia's restrictions on ballot access for independent candidates by weighing the State in-
terests against the individual's interests).
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merely control the procedures of the electoral process." 7 Rather, the
statute was a content-based restriction on speech.11
8
Concluding that the Ohio Supreme Court had used an inappropriately
lenient standard of review, 1 9 the McIntyre Court emphasized that a law
burdening core political speech requires exacting scrutiny review.'
20
Under that level of review, the Court will uphold a restriction on speech
only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. 12' The
Court stressed that the campaign-related speech the Ohio disclosure stat-
ute regulated was at the center of the First Amendment's protection of
speech. 122 Accordingly, the Court described Mrs. McIntyre's leafletting
as the quintessential example of First Amendment expression and de-
clared that no other type of speech deserved greater constitutional
protection. 123
In conducting its exacting scrutiny analysis, the Court evaluated two
state interests that Ohio contended were sufficiently compelling to justify
the restrictive statute: (1) the interest in providing information to the
electorate; and (2) the interest in preventing fraud and libel.124  The
Court rejected Ohio's asserted informational interest as being insufficient
to justify the statute. 25 The Court reasoned that providing information
to the electorate simply meant furnishing additional details that might
117. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.
118. See id. The Court described the statute as a content-based restriction on speech
for two reasons. See id. First, the statute required specific identifying information-the
issuer's name and address-to be included in campaign flyers. See id. (citing OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)). Second, the statute only applied to leaflets
containing campaign-related content. See id. But see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ohio 1993), (stating that the Ohio disclosure requirement does not
impact the content of an author's message), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
119. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519.
120. See id. (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)); supra text
accompanying notes 62-64 (discussing the exacting scrutiny standard applied in Bellotti).
121. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786).
122. See id. at 1518. Discussing the importance of free speech in the election context,
the Court recalled that a major purpose of the First Amendment was to protect political
speech regarding issues and candidates. See id. at 1519 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))). The
Court explained that the First Amendment provides the greatest protection to political
speech in order to encourage the discussion and debate of important political and social
issues. See id. at 1518-19 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
123. See id. at 1519. The Court noted that the protection of political speech extends not
only to speech regarding a candidate for office, but also to speech concerning issues to be
decided in an election. See id. (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1520; supra also notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing the
Ohio Supreme Court's treatment of the State's asserted informational interest).
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strengthen or weaken an argument; consequently, the Court considered
the identity of an author to be no different from other information which
the author chooses to include or exclude.' 26 Thus, the State could not
compel authors to include information they might otherwise omit.
127
In evaluating Ohio's asserted interest in preventing fraud and libel, the
Court found that the statute was not Ohio's principal weapon against
fraudulent or libelous campaign literature. 28 Other sections of the Ohio
Election Code directly prohibited making or distributing false statements
in political campaigns for candidates or ballot issues.129 Thus, the Court
126. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519. Additionally, the Court noted that the name and
address of an author would have little value to readers who did not know the author. See
id. at 1520.
127. See id. at 1520.
128. See id. at 1520-21. For the text of § 3599.09(A), the identification statute, see
supra note 15.
129. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520. Ohio's Election Code provisions regarding fraud
were found in code §§ 3599.09.1(B) and 3599.09.2(B). OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3599.09.1(B), 3599.09.2(B) (Anderson 1988) (current versions at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3517.21(B), 3517.22(B) (Anderson 1996)). Section 3599.09.1(B) provided:
No person, during the course of any campaign for nomination or election to pub-
lic office or office of a political party, by means of campaign materials, including
sample ballots, an advertisement on radio or television or in a newspaper or peri-
odical, a public speech, press release, or otherwise, shall knowingly and with in-
tent to affect the outcome of such campaign do any of the following: (1) Use the
title of an office not currently held by a candidate in a manner that implies that
the candidate does currently hold that office ... (2) Make a false statement con-
cerning the formal schooling or training completed or attempted by a candidate
... (3) Make a false statement concerning the professional, occupational, or voca-
tional licenses held by a candidate ... (4) Make a false statement that a candidate
or public official has been indicted or convicted of a theft offense, extortion, or
other crime involving financial corruption or moral turpitude; (5) Make a state-
ment that a candidate has been indicted for any crime or has been the subject of a
finding by the Ohio elections commission without disclosing the outcome of any
legal proceedings resulting from the indictment or finding; (6) Make a false state-
ment that a candidate or official has a record of treatment or confinement for
mental disorder; (7) Make a false statement that a candidate or official has been
subjected to military discipline for criminal misconduct or dishonorably dis-
charged from the armed services; (8) Falsely identify the source of a statement,
issue statements under the name of another person without authorization, or
falsely state the endorsement of or opposition to a candidate by a person or publi-
cation; (9) Make a false statement concerning the voting record of a candidate or
public official; (10) Post, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a
false statement, either knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not, concerning a candidate that is designed to promote
the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.
Id. § 3599.09.1(B) (emphasis added) (current version at § 3517.21(B)); see also Robert M.
O'Neil, Regulating Speech to Cleanse Political Campaigns, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 575, 587
(1992) ("[Ohio's] regulation of negative campaign advertisements is more detailed and
more extensive than that of perhaps any other state.").
Section 3599.09.2(B) provided:
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reasoned that the identification statute was merely a supplement to
Ohio's other election fraud laws.'30 The Court further explained that
although the anonymity ban aided enforcement of the other fraud provi-
sions 13 and deterred the distribution of false statements, those were only
ancillary benefits that did not justify the statute's broad restrictions on
speech. 132
No person, during the course of any campaign in advocacy of or in opposition to
the adoption of any ballot proposition or issue, by means of campaign material,
including sample ballots, an advertisement on radio or television or in a newspa-
per or periodical, a public speech, a press release, or otherwise, shall knowingly
and with intent to affect the outcome of such campaign do any of the following:
(1) Falsely identify the source of a statement, issue statements under the name of
another person without authorization, or falsely state the endorsement of or op-
position to a ballot proposition or issue by a person or publication; (2) Post, pub-
lish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate, a false statement, either
knowing the same to be false or acting with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not, that is designed to promote the adoption or defeat of any ballot
proposition or issue.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09.2(B) (emphasis added) (current version at § 3517.22(B)).
130. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1521 & n.12. The Court referred to the other statutes to
emphasize that Ohio had already addressed the issue of election fraud. See id. at n.12. The
Court reasoned that the ban on anonymous campaign literature, found in § 3599.09(A),
indirectly sought to meet the same goals as the fraud statutes in §§ 3599.09.1(B) and
3599.09.2(B). See id. Therefore, the McIntyre Court concluded that the anonymity ban
was only a supplement to the fraud provisions. See id.
Moreover, the Court also pointed out that Ohio enforces the tort of defamation and,
thus, provides a remedy for people who are harmed by libelous campaign literature. See
id. at 1521 n.13.
131. See id. at 1521. The Court acknowledged that the identification statute would as-
sist the State in identifying, locating, and prosecuting violators of the election fraud laws.
See id. Nevertheless, the Court also pointed out that the facts of Mrs. McIntyre's case
demonstrate that violators of the election code may still be caught even when their cam-
paign-related literature is anonymous; thus, the anonymity of a leaflet's author does not
necessarily protect the author from prosecution for violating the election code. See id. at
1522.
132. See id. at 1521. The McIntyre Court described the Ohio identification statute as an
"extremely broad prohibition" and provided several reasons for this characterization. Id.
at 1521-22. First, the Court noted that the anonymity ban applied to campaign literature
that was not false or misleading, such as Mrs. McIntyre's flyers. See id. at 1521. Second,
the statute applied not only to candidates and their official campaign organizations, but
also to individuals acting independently, like Mrs. McIntyre. See id. at 1521 & n.14. Third,
the anonymity ban applied to elections of candidates, as well as to ballot issues, which
generally do not present a risk of corruption. See id. at 1521 & n.15. Fourth, the statute
applied to campaign literature distributed on the night before an election, when opponents
would have no opportunity to respond, and to literature distributed far in advance, when
opponents could easily respond. See id at 1521 & n.16. Finally, the statute applied regard-
less of the proponent's reason for remaining anonymous or the strength of her interest in
anonymity. See id at 1522; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the
value of anonymity).
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The Supreme Court also rejected Ohio's argument that the Bellotti and
Buckley decisions supported the Ohio statute, noting that neither case
concerned a ban on anonymous campaign literature. 13 3 The McIntyre
Court distinguished Bellotti but conceded that the decision acknowledged
that identification of the source of a political advertisement may be re-
quired so that people can better evaluate its message and argument. 134
The Court determined, however, that because Bellotti involved corporate
advertising, its acknowledgment did not necessarily apply to campaign-
related speech by individuals like Mrs. McIntyre. 35
The Court also distinguished Buckley's conclusion that the governmen-
tal interest in disclosing the source of a candidate's funding outweighed
any harm to First Amendment freedoms. 136 The Court explained that the
conclusion does not apply to independent activities by individuals, such as
distributing flyers.' 37 The Court stated that mandatory disclosure of cam-
paign contributions to a candidate is justified because it avoids the ap-
pearance of corruption.138 Moreover, the Court further explained that
disclosure of campaign expenditures by individuals deters people from
providing financial support to a candidate as a quid pro quo for special
favors after the candidate is elected: 39 The Court emphasized, however,
that these concerns do not apply to an individual distributing leaflets on a
ballot issue because ballot issues do not give rise to the same notions of
corruption as candidate elections. 4 °
133. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522-24. The Court pointed out that Bellotti involved
corporate speech, and Buckley concerned disclosure of campaign expenditures. See id. at
1522.
134. See id. & n.18; see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing footnote
32 of Belloni).
135. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522. The Court also noted that the Bellotti Court had
drawn a distinction between corporate speech and individual speech and had stressed that
it was not deciding whether corporations have the same level of free speech protections as
individuals. See id. & n.17 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777-78 & n.13
(1978)).
136. See id. at 1523.
137. See id.
138. See id.; see supra notes 44, 49-50 and text accompanying notes 41-51 (discussing
the facts and rationale of the Buckley decision).
139. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1523.
140. See id. The Court further noted that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
reviewed in Buckley, regulated candidate elections, rather than issue-based referenda. See
id.
In addition, the Court also characterized the Ohio identification statute as more intru-
sive than the federal disclosure requirement upheld in Buckley. See id. Ohio's identifica-
tion requirement was more personal than Buckley's financial disclosure mandate because
campaign-related flyers are frequently personal statements of a political viewpoint. See id.
Thus, the McIntyre Court declared that an identification requirement for campaign litera-
ture is particularly intrusive because disclosure of the author's name reveals his or her
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Finally, the Court described anonymous pamphleteering as an honora-
ble tradition that shields individuals from the "tyranny of the majority" 141
and protects them from retaliation by others who disagree with their
ideas. 142 Anonymity ensures that an individual's ideas will not be sup-
pressed by fear of reprisal. 143 The Court noted that although anonymity
could be used as a shield for fraud, our society places greater emphasis on
the value of free speech than on the risks of its abuse.1'" Thus, because
Ohio did not show that its interest in preventing the abuse of anonymous
campaign speech was compelling enough to justify the significant in-
fringement on free speech that its identification requirement created, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional. 145
C. The Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Ginsburg: Highlighting Unanswered Questions
In a brief concurrence, 4 6 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed with
the dissent's argument that the majority opinion was unwarranted by ex-
isting case law.147 Justice Ginsburg analogized Mrs. McIntyre's situation
to the governmental infringement on First Amendment freedoms found
in City of Ladue v. Gilleo'" and United States v. Grace.'49 In Gilleo, the
Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting yard and window signs. 5 °
personal opinions on a controversial issue. See id. Disclosure of a campaign expenditure,
on the other hand, reveals less information, is less personal, and is unlikely to result in
retaliation. See id.
In sum, the Court reasoned that although Buckley allows states to enact statutes that
infringe on speech in order to serve a compelling governmental interest, it does not justify
the extremely broad restriction of Ohio's identification statute. See id. at 1524.
141. Id. at 1524 (citing J.S. MIL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 3-4 (R. McCallum ed., 1947)).
142. See id. at 1524; see also supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text (discussing the
value of anonymous speech throughout history in preventing retaliation, protecting the
freedom of association, and avoiding a chilling effect on speech).
143. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg joined in the majority opinion,
but also filed a separate concurrence. See id.
147. See id.; see infra note 174 (discussing relevant case law).
148. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
149. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
150. See Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2040. The City of Ladue, Missouri enacted an ordinance
prohibiting homeowners from displaying any signs on their property other than address
signs, "'for sale' signs, and warning signs. See id. Margaret Gilleo placed a sign on her
front lawn displaying the message, "'Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress
Now."' Id. Gilleo filed suit against the City, arguing that the ordinance violated her First
Amendment freedom of speech. See id. After the district court issued a preliminary in-
junction against the City, Gilleo placed a smaller sign in a window of her house that read,
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In Grace, the Court held that a statute banning the display of flags or
banners on the grounds of the Supreme Court building could not be ex-
tended to the surrounding public sidewalks. 151 Thus, Justice Ginsburg
found that Mrs. McIntyre's right to hand out leaflets was firmly rooted in
case law.1
52
Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg raised interesting and important ques-
tions about the future impact of McIntyre. Noting that the Court left
open matters not presented by Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets, Justice Ginsburg
highlighted the majority's recognition that Ohio's interest in regulating
the electoral process might justify some type of identification require-
ment.153 Although Justice Ginsburg explained that McIntyre would allow
a state to require a speaker to disclose his or her identity in "other, larger
"'For Peace in the Gulf."' See id. The City Council then repealed the ordinance and en-
acted a new, replacement ordinance. Id. The second ordinance prohibited all signs within
the City, other than those specifically exempted, such as church signs, commercial signs,
and gas station signs. See id. at 2040-41 & nn.5-6. After Gilleo amended her complaint to
challenge the new ordinance, the district court held that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional, and the court of appeals affirmed. See id. at 2041.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision and held that the ordinance vio-
lated the First Amendment. See id. at 2047. The City argued that the ordinance was neces-
sary because the proliferation of too many signs within the City would create visual clutter,
decrease property values, and tarnish the beauty of the community. See id. at 2041. The
Court reasoned, however, that the ordinance foreclosed an important means of communi-
cation and expression for city residents. See id. at 2045. The Court noted that although
municipal prohibitions on signs might be content-neutral restrictions, they nevertheless en-
danger the freedom of speech because they are overinclusive, restricting too much speech
and limiting the opportunities for free expression. See id. & n.13. The Court concluded
that the City of Ladue could address the problems associated with the proliferation of signs
using other, less restrictive measures that do not violate the First Amendment rights of city
residents. See id. at 2047; see also Alan Howard, City of Ladue v. Gilleo: Content Discrimi-
nation and the Right to Participate in Public Debate, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 349, 351
(1995) (arguing that the Ladue decision is significant because it acknowledges the exist-
ence of an individual's right to participate in public debate and discussion).
151. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 183. Grace concerned a federal law that prohibited the
display of flags or banners in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds.
See id. at 172-73. Mary Grace was standing on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court
building, holding a sign inscribed with the text of the First Amendment, when a Court
police officer informed her that her conduct violated the statute and warned her that if she
did not leave, she would be arrested. See id. at 174. Grace then left the grounds. See id.
She filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging
the statute. See id. After the district court dismissed her complaint, the court of appeals
held that the statute unconstitutionally restricted her First Amendment rights. See id. at
174-75. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that the statute could not be
applied to the public sidewalks near the Court because they constituted a "public forum."
See id. at 179-80.
152. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
153. See id.
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circumstances," she gave no indication of what "larger circumstances"
might justify such a requirement. 54
2. Justice Thomas: Looking to the Founders
Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with the majority opinion that the
Ohio statute was invalid, but he suggested a different analytical ap-
proach.155 Rather than tracing the history of anonymous speech, as the
majority opinion had done, Justice Thomas sought to determine the origi-
nal meaning of the First Amendment's phrase "freedom of speech, or of
the press" and to decipher whether it protected anonymous political liter-
ature. 56 Finding no official record of discussions or debates about anon-
ymous political expression by the Drafters of the Bill of Rights, or by
participants in the state ratifying conventions, Justice Thomas looked to
other historical evidence of the practices and beliefs of the Framers re-
garding anonymous political speech. 57 Examining a wide range of his-
torical evidence from that era, 5 8 Justice Thomas stressed that the
Framers relied extensively on anonymity, publishing anonymous political
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1525 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Although he did not join the
majority opinion, Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. See id.
156. Id. Justice Thomas emphasized that constitutional interpretation of the First
Amendment must focus on its original meaning because the Constitution is a written docu-
ment, and its meaning does not change over time. See id. (citing South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)).
157. See id. Justice Thomas began his analysis by noting that Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets
clearly implicated the freedom of the press. See id. The Framers of the Constitution, he
explained, used the word "press" to refer to independent printers who published small
newspapers or pamphlets. See id. Justice Thomas noted that the practice of publishing and
distributing pamphlets played an important role in the American Revolution and in the
ratification process of the Constitution. See id. He contended, however, that it did not
matter whether the right to distribute anonymous literature was characterized as freedom
of the press, or freedom of speech, because the crucial factor in the analysis should be
whether the Framers considered the First Amendment to protect anonymous writing. See
id.
158. See id. at 1526-30. Justice Thomas noted that members of the Continental Con-
gress perceived a link between anonymity and the freedom of the press. See id. at 1526.
He related the story of an attempt by the Continental Congress in 1779 to discover the
identity of the author of an anonymous newspaper article criticizing members of Congress.
See id. After one member of Congress proposed that they force the printer of the newspa-
per to testify before the Congress to reveal information concerning the author, several
other members of Congress objected to the proposal as a violation of the freedom of the
press. See id. Their arguments prevailed, and the printer was never called to testify. See
id.
Justice Thomas also pointed out that in the late 1700s, the New Jersey State Legislature
believed that anonymous writing was protected. See id. In 1779, the New Jersey Legisla-
tive Council ordered a newspaper editor to reveal the identity of an anonymous author
who had criticized the Governor of New Jersey in a newspaper satire and signed his work
with the pseudonym, "Cincinnatus." See id. When the editor refused and asserted that the
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literature such as the Federalist Papers. 15 9 After reviewing the historical
evidence, Justice Thomas concluded that the Framers understood the
First Amendment to protect an individual's right to anonymously express
political opinions regarding candidates or issues. 160
Justice Thomas rebuked the majority for failing to seek the original
meaning of the First Amendment16 and, instead, "superimpos[ing] its
modern theories concerning expression upon the constitutional text."'162
order violated the freedom of the press, the State Assembly agreed and voted to support
him. See id.
Another example concerned an anonymous article by "Scipio," who was actually the
Governor of New Jersey, accusing a state officer of stealing or losing state money. See id.
at 1526-27. When the officer challenged Scipio to reveal his true name, the Governor
responded with a series of anonymous articles arguing that the freedom of the press pro-
tects anonymous political writing. See id. at 1527.
Justice Thomas also reviewed the vigorous debate between the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists concerning anonymous writing. See id. at 1527-29. Two Federalist newspapers,
the Massachusetts Centinel and the Massachusetts Gazette, instituted policies against pub-
lishing anonymous Anti-Federalist articles and urged other newspapers to do the same.
See id. at 1527. Anti-Federalist authors in Pennsylvania and New York, such as the "Fed-
eral Farmer" and "Philadelphiensis," who both wrote anonymously, vehemently criticized
these policies as violative of the freedom of the press. See id. at 1527-28. Justice Thomas
concluded that the Federalists appeared to agree with the Anti-Federalists' rationale. See
id. at 1528. No other newspapers adopted the anonymity policy, and the original two
quickly retreated on their stance and published several anonymous articles by both Feder-
alists and Anti-Federalists. See id. Thus, Justice Thomas concluded that both the Federal-
ists and the Anti-Federalists believed that the freedom of the press protected an author's
right to publish anonymously. See id. at 1528-29.
159. See id. at 1525-26. Justice Thomas explained that authors used pseudonyms during
the Revolutionary period to conceal their identity from the British. See id. at 1529; see also
supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text (discussing the value of anonymity). During the
ratification process of the Constitution, the use of pseudonyms increased, and authors such
as "Publius," "Cato," and the "Federal Farmer" anonymously debated the Constitution in
newspaper articles and pamphlets. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1529. After the Constitu-
tion's ratification, anonymous political articles and pamphlets were used to express views
on political candidates during elections. See id. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
used the pseudonyms "Helvidius" and "Pacificus" to debate President Washington's neu-
trality in the war between Great Britain and France. See id. at 1530.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, contended that the prevalence of anony-
mous political expression during this historical period does not necessarily prove that ano-
nymity is a constitutional right. See id. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1530 (Thomas, J., concurring).
161. See id. Justice Thomas explained that rather than seeking to find the original
meaning of the First Amendment, the majority analyzed the case using three approaches:
(1) recalling examples of anonymous writing from literature, as well as politics; (2) deter-
mining that the value of anonymous speech to the speaker and to society outweighs the
interest in disclosing the author's identity; and (3) finding that the Ohio identification stat-
ute, § 3599.09(A), does not meet an exacting scrutiny standard because it is a " 'content-
based' restriction on speech." Id.
162. Id. For example, Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion's discussion of
anonymous literary works is irrelevant to the analysis of this case because it does not ex-
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Thus, because the majority's analysis was unrelated to the Constitution's
text and history, Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment. 163
D. The Dissent: Striving to Protect the Electoral Process
Justice Antonin Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, declared that the majority opinion erroneously identified a
constitutional right to anonymity in election-related expression."6 He ar-
gued that although anonymous electoral speech was common when the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment were debated and
adopted, there is very little historical evidence indicating that the Framers
regarded anonymity in electoral speech as a constitutional right. 165 Thus,
Justice Scalia stressed the difficulty of determining the Constitution's
meaning with respect to anonymous election-related speech. 166
In the absence of illustrative historical evidence on the issue, Justice
Scalia relied on an examination of the widespread and traditional prac-
tices of the American public. 167 He argued that there is a presumption of
constitutionality of governmental policies that have been adopted
throughout most of the nation and have been in effect for a long period of
time. 68 Justice Scalia observed that the Ohio identification statute had
plain the Framers' original understanding of the freedom of speech and press. See id.; see
also id. at 1516 & n.4 (discussing anonymous literary works).
163. See id. at 1530. Justice Thomas reiterated that when the Court has interpreted
other provisions of the Constitution, it has considered itself bound by the Constitution's
text and the Framers' intent. See id.
Moreover, Justice Thomas also pointed out that he disagreed with Justice Scalia's dis-
sent, which emphasized the widespread and long-standing acceptance of identification stat-
utes throughout the United States. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 167-70
(explaining this portion of Justice Scalia's rationale). Although Justice Thomas indicated
that he, too, was reluctant to overturn such long-standing practice, he determined that the
historical evidence he surveyed outweighed the modern traditions of the states. See Mcln-
tyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1530.
164. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. See id. Justice Scalia emphasized that none of the historical evidence that Justice
Thomas discussed in his concurrence involved governmental restrictions on electoral
speech but, instead, concerned prohibitions on anonymous expression in general. See id. at
1532. For example, Justice Scalia contended that the Anti-Federalists' objection to two
Federalist newspapers' policies of refusing to publish anonymous Anti-Federalist works
was an objection to viewpoint-based restrictions on anonymity and freedom of speech that
did not concern any campaign or election-related issue. See id. In fact, Justice Scalia ob-
served that governmental regulation of the electoral process is a modern concept that did
not take hold until the late 1800s. See id.
166. See id. at 1532. Justice Scalia mentioned that not only is there no evidence of
governmental policies forbidding anonymous campaign literature, but there also is no
proof that the nonexistence of such regulations was due to the belief that they were uncon-
stitutional. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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been in effect for nearly eighty years and that forty-eight other states and
the District of Columbia had similar identification requirements. 169 Thus,
Justice Scalia concluded that the "universal" and long-standing practice
of prohibiting anonymous campaign literature must prevail over histori-
cal "speculation" about the original meaning of the First Amendment.17 °
Although he considered the practices of the American people to be
determinative in the case, Justice Scalia asserted that he would reach the
same result even if he shifted his analysis to an examination of case law
and the practical realities of electoral politics.'71 From this perspective,
Justice Scalia based his dissent on three main arguments.'72 First, he ar-
gued that the protection of the electoral process justifies restrictions on
speech that would otherwise be unconstitutional.'73 Second, he argued
that a right to anonymity is not such an important constitutional value
that the electoral process cannot be protected at its expense. 74 Third,
Justice Scalia contended that the Ohio disclosure statute protects and en-
hances democratic elections. 75 He asserted that people who are re-
quired to include their name on a document are less likely to make
169. See id. at 1532-33. Justice Scalia noted that the earliest identification statute was
enacted in Massachusetts in 1890, and that at the time McIntyre was decided, every state
except California had an identification statute. See id. at 1533 & n.2.
170. See id. at 1533-34 & n.3.
171. See id. at 1534-37.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1534. Justice Scalia noted that case law suggests that the protection of
the electoral process is more compelling than any other justification for regulating speech
because "'[o]ther rights ... are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.' " Id. (quoting
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)). Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned that Ohio has a
" 'compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process'" through statutes
like the one at issue in McIntyre. Id. (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). Justice Scalia further noted that protection of the
electoral process is such an important interest that the Court has prohibited political
speech entirely in areas that would impede the electoral process. See id. (citing Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 204-06 (1992) (plurality opinion).
174. See id. Justice Scalia noted that although several cases held that mandatory disclo-
sure requirements violated an individual's First Amendment associational rights, those
cases did not establish a general right to anonymity. See id. (citing Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). Instead, the cases
acknowledged a right to an exemption from the disclosure requirements for people who
could demonstrate that disclosure of their identity would result in " 'threats, harassment,
or reprisals.'" Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam)). Addi-
tionally, Justice Scalia pointed out that Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan rejected the notion
of a general right to anonymity in speech. See id. at 1535 (citing Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Mor-
gan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)); see also supra note 40 (discussing Lewis Publishing).
175. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535-36. Justice Scalia questioned how unelected
judges could dispute the real-life experience and practical judgment of elected legislators
from 49 states, the District of Columbia, the United States Congress, Australia, Canada,
and England who all determined that prohibitions on anonymous election-related speech
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fraudulent statements than people who can do so anonymously. 176 More-
over, Justice Scalia argued that a prohibition on anonymous campaign
literature encourages a "civil and dignified level of campaign debate"
and discourages the type of "mudslinging' 1 77  that frequently
were beneficial in protecting democratic elections and improving the quality of campaigns.
See id.
176. See id. at 1536. In addition, Justice Scalia claimed that distributors of anonymous
campaign literature are more likely to be detected and punished than distributors of fraud-
ulent campaign literature. See id. Therefore, he reasoned that people would be more
likely to obey the identification requirement than the election fraud provisions, and, after
including their name on a document, would then be less likely to include a fraudulent
statement. See id.
Justice Scalia also criticized the majority opinion for its attempt to distinguish the Buck-
ley decision from McIntyre. See id. at 1537. He argued that the informational interest of
the Ohio statute was much more important than the informational interest of the Buckley
disclosure requirement. See id. at 1536-37. In addition, Justice Scalia considered the Buck-
ley disclosure requirement to be far more burdensome than Ohio's requirement that au-
thors include their name on election-related literature. See id.
177. Id. at 1536. Justice Scalia discussed the increase over the past several years of
"character assassination," or "mudslinging," designed to damage a candidate's public im-
age and support. Id. He noted that most of these harmful and tasteless attacks on candi-
dates do not contain any actionable fraudulent statements but, rather, consist of innuendo,
degrading comments, or disclosures about a candidate's personal life that are irrelevant to
the candidate's qualifications for elected office. See id. Justice Scalia feared that striking
down the ban on anonymous campaign literature would lead to an increase in this type of
mudslinging. See id.
The term "mudslinging" generally refers to the practice of disclosing private information
about the character and personal life of an opponent in order to damage the candidate's
chances of being elected. See E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITCS 15
(1991). This process frequently spreads gossip and innuendo about issues such as a candi-
date's sex life, previous drug use, psychological problems, or marital difficulties. See id.;
PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASH-
INGTON 177 (1995); BARBARA G. SALMORE & STEPHEN A. SALMORE, CANDIDATES, PAR-
TIES, AND CAMPAIGNS: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 160 (1989). Mudslinging and
other "dirty" campaign tactics have always been a part of American political life. See
Note, supra note 6, at 185 (surveying the history of negative campaign tactics in American
elections). For example, opponents of George Washington described him as having "mo-
narchical aspirations," and Thomas Jefferson's detractors claimed that he was "an illegiti-
mate madman and atheist." Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Political
Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 853 (1987). Abraham Lin-
coln was called "an ape, a buffoon, a fiend, a ghoul, a lunatic, a robber, a savage, a traitor,
and a weakling." Id. at 854. Leaflets distributed by opponents of Andrew Jackson accused
him of adultery and murder. See HERRNSON, supra, at 160. Relying on rumors that
Grover Cleveland fathered an illegitimate child, his opponents chanted," 'Ma, Ma, where's
my pa?' " Id. Cleveland's supporters responded," 'Gone to the White House, ha ha ha!'
Id.
These types of personal attacks on candidates have continued to the present. During the
1992 campaign, Democratic Congressman James Moran of Virginia attacked his Republi-
can challenger, Kyle McSlarrow, for using illegal drugs in college. See id. at 177. Moran's
plan to discredit McSlarrow backfired, however, when he was forced to admit that he, too,
had used illegal drugs. See id. In the 1992 presidential election, President William Clinton
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faced charges from his opponents, and from the media, that he committed adultery,
dodged the draft, and smoked marijuana. See DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION
ADVERTISING IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 1952-1992 138 (1993).
Anonymous leaflets often have been the source of a great deal of campaign mudslinging.
For example, in Montgomery County, Maryland, an individual distributed anonymous leaf-
lets criticizing a candidate for County Executive, in violation of the Maryland disclosure
statute. See Kevin Sullivan, Kid Gloves Come Off in Montgomery, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
1994, at Cl; see also Mark A. Whitt, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n: "A Whole
New Boutique of Wonderful First Amendment Litigation Opens Its Doors," 29 AKRON L.
REV. 423, 423 (1996) (citing the Montgomery County example). The anonymous culprit
circulated the leaflets by leaving them on chairs at a campaign debate, distributing them
door-to-door in the county, and mailing them to the candidate's financial contributors. See
Sullivan, supra, at C1. The outraged candidate responded, "'Someone is trying to spend
hundreds of dollars to manipulate this election and not take responsibility for it.' " Id. In
addition, he complained that the culprit had used a copy of his campaign finance report to
obtain the names and addresses of his contributors in order to mail them anonymous, neg-
ative leaflets. See id. "'I've spent 25 years of my life trying to clean up politics and open
up government. If the result of that is that my contributors are going to get a stream of
illegal mailings, that adds to my outrage.' " Id. County election records indicated that the
campaign managers of both of his opponents had made copies of his campaign finance
report. See id.
During the 1994 mayoral election in New Orleans, Louisiana, the grand jury indicted an
aide to one of the candidates for distributing anonymous campaign literature. See Kenneth
J. Cooper, Negative Themes Dominate Contest in New Orleans, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1994,
at A8; see also Whitt, supra, at 423 (citing the New Orleans example). The anonymous
leaflet accused another candidate of having several out-of-wedlock children and claimed
"that he is secretly bisexual, uses drugs, surrounds himself with drug dealers and receives
kickbacks." Cooper, supra, at A8.
In San Diego County, California, a stack of anonymous leaflets were found outside the
front door of an office building where the San Diego County Republican Central Commit-
tee was holding its monthly meeting. See Barry M. Horstman, Flyer Uses Vulgarity to At-
tack [Nonpartisan] Group Campaign: Anonymous Handout Containing Graphic
Anatomical References and Coarse Language Is Aimed at an Organization That Monitors
Political Extremists, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at B6; Correction, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1992, at B2 (correcting an error in the title of the article); see also Whitt, supra, at 423
(citing the San Diego example). The leaflets villified several women who head the Main-
stream Voters Project (MVP), a nonpartisan group that publishes newsletters monitoring
political candidates. See Horstman, supra, at B6; Correction, supra, at B2. The leaflets
described the group's leaders with offensive phrases such as, a" 'bitter man-hating bitch,'"
a "'militant dwarf who uses MVP to meet other women with hairy chests,' " and a " 'for-
mer poster child for birth control (who) starts the day by pouring Jack Daniels over her
breakfast.' " Horstman, supra, at B6. A similar situation also occurred in another part of
California, where anonymous campaign leaflets described one of the candidates as a
" 'proven pervert.'" See T.W. McGarry, Schaefer, Stratton Gain Leads in Local Races,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at Metro 2; see also Whitt, supra, at 423 (citing the incident).
178. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Commentators have noted that the last several campaign cycles have demonstrated the
rise of mudslinging and negative advertising. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at 15-17, 316-17
(highlighting the general rise in negative campaigning, particularly in the 1988 presidential
election); HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 176 (noting that in the 1992 elections, 71% of the
House elections, and almost all of the Senate elections, used negative advertisements);
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SALMORE & SALMORE, supra note 177, at 159-63 (discussing the causes and effects of
negative political advertising); WEST, supra note 177, at 46-52, 140-46 (discussing the nega-
tive advertisements of the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections); O'Neil, supra note 129, at
575-76 (noting the prominence of negative advertising in the 1988 presidential election);
Peter F. May, Note, State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide
of Deceptive Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 182, 186-91 (1992) (exploring the detri-
mental impact of the rise of negative campaigning); see also id. at 182 (noting a New York
Times/CBS News Poll indicating that voters believe that campaigns have become more
negative over the past decade).
Rather than supporting or building up one's own candidacy, the goal of negative adver-
tising, or negative campaigning, is to tear down an opponent and decrease his or her sup-
port among voters. See HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 176; May, supra, at 182. Candidates
commonly perform "opposition research" on their opponents in order to develop a foun-
dation from which to launch a negative attack. See HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 177.
This may include research into a candidate's personal and professional background includ-
ing his or her previous employment experience, political experience, legislative votes, polit-
ical speeches, and illegal or unethical activities. See id. at 177-78.
In addition, candidates often distort the record of their opponent's past achievements in
order to twist the truth to their advantage. See May, supra, at 183. Candidates also manip-
ulate facts and play with words to damage their opponent's reputation. See id. at 185. For
example, an egregiously deceptive distortion occurred during the 1990 Massachusetts
Democratic gubernatorial primary. Candidate John Silber's campaign advertisements at-
tacked his opponent, Francis Bellotti, by using a Boston Globe headline about Bellotti. See
id. The headline read, "'Questions linger over Bellotti's corruption record.' " Id. By in-
cluding this headline, Silber's advertisement implied that Bellotti had engaged in corrupt
activities. See id. In reality, however, the headline was for an article discussing Bellotti's
record prosecuting corruption during his tenure as the Attorney General of Massachusetts.
See id. In addition, candidates frequently distort their opponent's positions on campaign
issues. See Dan Balz, Dropping in Polls, Forbes Lashes Out: Publisher Accuses Opponents
of "Sabotage" Phone Campaign, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1996, at A13 (quoting 1996 presi-
dential candidate Steve Forbes's complaint that his opponents were misrepresenting his
position on a variety of campaign issues).
Several factors have contributed to the rise in negative campaigning. The diminished
role of political parties in structuring campaigns and the increase in candidate-centered
elections is partially responsible. See SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COM-
MUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 235 (1991); SALMORE &
SALMORE, supra note 177, at 160. Negative advertisements are common because candi-
dates and political consultants believe that they appeal to an alienated electorate and play
into the popular cynicism about politics and government. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at
17.
Perhaps the most important factor, however, is the prominence of television as a means
of political communication. See id. at 15; May, supra, at 179. Negative advertising is fre-
quently used in television commercials promoting candidates for elected office. See
DIONNE, supra note 177, at 15. Since the cost of television time is so expensive, candidates
can usually only afford brief spots of approximately 30 seconds. See id. at 15-16. Such a
short time period forces candidates to appeal to voters' feelings and emotions leaving little
time to present an in-depth discussion of issues. See id.; HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 247.
Thus, candidates often resort to making personal attacks against their opponents in order
to exploit the viewers' negative emotions. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at 15.
The most famous example of a negative campaign advertisement is the "Willie Horton"
commercial of the 1988 presidential campaign. Willie Horton, a convicted murderer, raped
a woman while on a weekend furlough from his Massachusetts prison. See id. at 77.
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Finally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's characterization of
anonymous leafletting as "an honorable tradition of advocacy and dis-
sent., 179 Rather, he contended that anonymity encourages fraud because
it eliminates accountability. 8 ° Thus, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that it dis-
torts the history of anonymous political speech and that it will lead to
even more negative campaigning and electoral fraud in the future.
181
Although the advertisement was produced and sponsored by an independent group, Presi-
dent George Bush campaigned on the "Willie Horton issue" and benefited from the adver-
tisement. May, supra, at 187 n.48. Bush used Willie Horton as a symbol to illustrate that
his opponent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, was soft on crime. See DIONNE,
supra note 177, at 77. Dukakis failed to respond to the advertisement and fell behind in
the race, eventually losing the election. See id. at 315; May, supra, at 187 & n.49. Based on
that lesson, political candidates now respond quickly to their opponents' negative adver-
tisements, for fear of " 'doing a Dukakis.' " May, supra, at 187, 193 (footnotes omitted).
Consequently, voters are subject to a continuing cycle of negative campaign advertise-
ments. See id. at 181, 187. For more information on the subject of political advertisements
on television, including statistical data on negative advertising, see WEST, supra note 177.
179. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See id.
181. See id. ("But to strike down the Ohio law ... on the ground that all anonymous
communication is in our society traditionally sacrosanct, seems to me a distortion of the
past that will lead to a coarsening of the future."). Justice Scalia also noted that striking
down the Ohio statute would invalidate similar identification requirements of 48 other
states and the federal government. See id.
Examples from the 1996 presidential election illustrate the harmful effects of negative
campaigning and its link to anonymity. During the campaign, the bulk of the advertise-
ments for the Iowa Republican caucuses and the New Hampshire primary were negative in
tone. See Dan Balz & Edward Walsh, In Iowa Stretch, GOP's Hot Race Is for 2nd Place,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1996, at Al, A22 (describing the 1996 Iowa caucus campaign as "by
far the most negative in history" and pointing out that some Iowa voters are so disgusted
with the negativity that they may not even participate in the caucuses); Howard Kurtz, New
Hampshire Voters Buried By Avalanche of Negative Advertisements, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1996, at All (chronicling the barrage of negative campaign advertisements in New
Hampshire).
Moreover, voters sharply criticized the presidential candidates for their negative cam-
paign tactics. For example, at a town meeting in New Hampshire, a voter commented to
presidential candidate Steve Forbes, "'Your positive statements are wonderful, but the neg-
ative statements that you and some of the other candidates are putting out demean the
process and insult my intelligence."' Forbes Grilled over Tough TV Ads, HAMPTON UNION
(New Hampshire), Feb. 6, 1996, at 2.
In addition to voters complaining about the negative advertisements, candidates them-
selves also have expressed their concern, notwithstanding negative attacks of their own.
See Balz, supra note 178, at Al, A13. Indeed, candidate Forbes alleged that he was the
victim of an anonymous phone and leaflet campaign in Iowa and New Hampshire, spon-
sored by his opponents. See id. at A13. Speaking at a campaign rally, Forbes remarked,
'Unfortunately, some of my opponents are engaging in desperate distortions,
making anonymous phone calls .... They're sending out anonymous pamphlets.
They're misrepresenting my position on the flat tax. They're misrepresenting my
position on abortion. They're misrepresenting my position on gays in the mili-
tary. They're misrepresenting my position on Social Security.'
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III. MCINTYRE'S SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
The McIntyre decision established that an individual has a right to ano-
nymity in campaign-related speech.1 82 By applying an exacting scrutiny
test to the Ohio statute, the Court determined that the State's proffered
interests in preventing fraud in the electoral process and providing infor-
mation to voters did not justify the restriction that the statute placed on
freedom of speech. 183 The decision deserves examination from three per-
spectives: (1) the Court's analytical framework and narrow holding, (2)
the relationship between the Court's decision and prior case law, and (3)
the decision's potential impact on the various disclosure statutes of the
forty-nine other states, and the District of Columbia, that had similar laws
when McIntyre reached the Supreme Court.
A. A Critical Look at McIntyre
1. Selection of the Exacting Scrutiny Standard
The Court's decision to use an exacting scrutiny standard to analyze the
constitutionality of the Ohio statute was based on its determination that
the statute was a content-based restriction that burdened core political
speech, rather than a regulation of the electoral process. 184 In making
this choice, however, the Court turned away from a series of earlier cases
applying a lower level of scrutiny to state election regulations. 8 ' After
Id. Voters who reported receiving the anonymous calls said that the callers refused to
identify themselves, or to say which campaign they were working for or who was paying
them. See Thomas B. Edsall & Kevin Merida, Forbes Says Dole Hired Telemarketer to
Wage Anonymous Campaign, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1996, at A24.
When Forbes accused presidential candidate Robert J. Dole of hiring a telemarketing
firm to make the calls, the Dole campaign and the telemarketing firm both denied the
allegation. See id. Dole's campaign manager, Scott Reed, responded that "Forbes was
'attempting to muddy the waters by falsely accusing the Dole campaign and other candi-
dates' of making the calls." Id. Ironically, while criticizing the negative campaign tactics of
his opponents, Forbes's own campaign advertisements were described as "almost totally
negative." Kurtz, supra, at All.
182. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516-24.
183. See id. at 1519-22.
184. See id. at 1518-19; see also supra text accompanying notes 119-21 (discussing the
Court's rationale for using an exacting scrutiny standard of review).
185. Compare McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518-19 (discounting the ordinary litigation test of
Anderson as too lenient), with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992) (applying
the ordinary litigation test to Hawaii's ban on write-in voting), and Tashjian v. Republican
Party, 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) (using the ordinary litigation test to scrutinize a Con-
necticut statute requiring voters in a party primary to be registered members of that party),
and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (articulating and applying an ordi-
nary litigation balancing test to Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates),
and Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (using a balancing test to examine Califor-
nia's statute regulating independent candidates' access to the ballot), and McDonald v.
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McIntyre, most state regulations of the electoral process will continue to
be analyzed using the lower-level scrutiny of the ordinary litigation bal-
ancing test, 186 but state laws regulating campaign literature will now be
subject to exacting scrutiny.' 8 7 Therefore, although states will continue to
have a level of discretion in regulating election procedures, they will have
less flexibility in regulating campaign literature.
18 8
Although campaign literature disclosure requirements may not control
the procedures of the electoral process in the same way as regulations on
who may vote, or how a candidate's name is placed on the ballot, the
purpose of disclosure requirements is sufficiently analogous to justify the
same level of judicial scrutiny. In Storer v. Brown,189 a case upholding a
California statute restricting potential candidates' placement on the bal-
lot, the Court explained that state election codes regulating electoral pro-
cedures are essential to ensure that elections are fair, honest, and
orderly.19° Similarly, state regulations on campaign literature, such as
disclosure requirements and prohibitions on fraudulent statements, are
also intended to ensure that elections are fair, honest, and orderly.' 9 ' Be-
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-09 (1969) (using a lower level of judicial
scrutiny to examine an Illinois statute which omitted prisoners from the list of people eligi-
ble to vote by absentee ballot). But see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1972)
(applying a close scrutiny standard of review to examine a Texas statute establishing a
tiered filing-fee scheme based upon the size of the population in the county in which the
candidate is running).
186. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-34 (regarding a regulation on write-in voting); Tash-
jian, 479 U.S. at 213-14 (regarding a regulation on voting in party primaries); Anderson,
460 U.S. at 789 (regarding a regulation on early filing deadlines); Storer, 415 U.S. at 730
(regarding a regulation on ballot access); McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807-09 (regarding a regu-
lation on absentee voting for prisoners).
187. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.
188. By establishing that prohibitions on anonymous campaign literature are subject to
exacting scrutiny, the Court made it more difficult for states to establish identification re-
quirements that will pass constitutional muster. Thus, the Court effectively hindered the
states' ability to regulate electoral speech in order to maintain the integrity of the electoral
process. See id. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that exacting scrutiny review is "or-
dinarily the kiss of death"); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 ("[T]o subject every voting regulation
to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a com-
pelling state interest ... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are
operated equitably and efficiently.").
189. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
190. See id. at 730 ("[T]here must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to
be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the demo-
cratic processes.").
191. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-21 (acknowledging that the Ohio identification
statute aids in the prevention of fraud and libel in the electoral process); Brief of Respon-
dent at 11, McIntyre (No. 93-986) (arguing that the Ohio identification statute is an "inte-
gral part" of Ohio's "regulatory scheme" of election laws designed to deter fraud and
inform the electorate).
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cause the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the states' inter-
ests in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, one could
reasonably conclude that the distinction between disclosure requirements
and regulations on election procedures is not great enough to warrant a
higher level of scrutiny for disclosure requirements.192 As the Ohio
Other states have also recognized that disclosure requirements are necessary to ensure
that elections are fair, honest, and orderly. For example, in 1995, Louisiana's identification
statute stated the following:
The Legislature of Louisiana finds that the state has a compelling interest in tak-
ing every necessary step to assure that all elections are held in a fair and ethical
manner and finds that an election cannot be held in a fair and ethical manner
when any candidate or other person is allowed to print or distribute any material
which falsely alleges that a candidate is supported by or affiliated with another
candidate, group of candidates, or other person, or a political faction, or to pub-
lish anonymous statements that make scurrilous, false, or irresponsible adverse
comment about a candidate or a proposition. The legislature further finds that
the people of this state have a right to know and that, among other things, it is
essential to the protection of the electoral process that the people know who is
responsible for such publications in order to more properly evaluate the state-
ments contained in them and to informatively exercise their right to vote.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added), amended
by 1995 La. Acts 300, § 1. After McIntyre, the Louisiana Legislature amended this statute
by deleting the word "anonymous" from the statute's language and by adding the addi-
tional statement: "The legislature further finds that the state has a compelling interest to
protect the electoral process." See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463(A) (West Supp. 1996).
192. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1993) (citing Bur-
dick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). An important
factor in reaching this conclusion is that campaign literature may contain false allegations
against candidates and, thus, could prevent an election from being fair, honest, and orderly.
Clearly, campaign literature containing false statements has the potential to sway voter
opinion and unfairly influence the outcome of an election.
Indeed, some commentators have argued that increases in potentially damaging elec-
tion-related speech threaten to disturb the American electoral process. See May, supra
note 178, at 179-191. Although May focuses on televised political advertisements, his anal-
ysis may also be extended to printed campaign literature. May argues that negative polit-
ical advertising harms the electoral process in a number of ways. See id. at 186-90. First,
he contends that negative advertising discourages qualified potential candidates from run-
ning for public office. See id. at 186. He also notes that negative advertising influences the
way legislators vote because they fear the impact of their opponents' potential negative
campaign advertisements in the next election. See id. at 186-87. Second, May argues that
negative advertisements appeal to emotion, rather than reason, thereby encouraging an
escalating cycle of negativism through attacks and counterattacks, which ultimately dimin-
ishes public trust in the electoral process. See id. at 187. Third, May observes that the
cycle of negative advertisements increases the financial burden on all candidates. See id. at
187-89. Fourth, he stresses that negative campaign advertisements prevent voters from
accurately assessing candidates because they discourage debate over important public is-
sues and mislead the voters. See id. at 189. Thus, negative campaigning creates the poten-
tial for election results that do not represent a rational and informed decision by the voting
public. See id. Finally, May asserts that, although federal law requires political advertise-
ments to identify their candidate or sponsor, candidates shield themselves in a cloak of
anonymity and distance themselves from attacks on their opponents by omitting the candi-
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Supreme Court noted, subjecting all election regulations to exacting scru-
tiny would substantially hinder the states' ability to ensure fair
elections.
193
2. Application of the Exacting Scrutiny Standard
Notwithstanding the possibility that the ordinary litigation test may
have been more appropriate, the Supreme Court's application of the ex-
acting scrutiny standard deserves examination. The McIntyre Court re-
jected Ohio's interest in preventing fraud, reasoning that Ohio has other
laws that pertain more directly to electoral fraud and the prohibition of
false statements during campaigns. 94 The majority's conclusion, how-
ever, fails to recognize the strength of Ohio's interest because there is no
guarantee that Ohio's other election laws actually prevent fraud. 195
In McIntyre, the Court argued that the facts of Mrs. McIntyre's case
demonstrate that anonymity of campaign literature does not prevent its
author from being held responsible for complying with election laws. 196
Yet Mrs. McIntyre's case is not a true example of anonymous leafletting
because she personally passed out her flyers at a public meeting, and
some of the flyers included her name.1 97 In truly fraudulent or dishonest
situations, the anonymous author may be extremely difficult to identify
date's name, or by including identifying information that is so small that it is difficult to
read. See id. at 190. In addition, other commentators also have argued that negative
campaigning alienates the public and leads to low voter turnout in elections. See SALMORE
& SALMORE, supra note 177, at 162.
On the other hand, some commentators contend that negative campaigning is beneficial
to the electoral process. See HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 176 (1995) (arguing that nega-
tive campaigning enhances the electoral process by providing accountability in the political
process); POPKIN, supra note 178, at 235 (quoting Bush campaign speechwriter Peggy Noo-
nan's assessment of the 1988 presidential election: "There should have been more name-
calling, mud-slinging and fun. It should have been rock-'em-sock-'em the way great cam-
paigns have been in the past.").
193. See McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433
(1992)); see also supra text accompanying notes 102-04 (explaining the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision to use an ordinary litigation test, rather than an exacting scrutiny
standard).
194. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-22. The Court determined that Ohio's ban on
anonymous campaign literature was not the State's principal weapon against fraud. See id.
at 1521. In other words, if the anonymity ban did not exist, fraud would still be prohibited
under other Ohio election laws. See id.; supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the McIntyre Court's analysis of Ohio's interest in preventing fraud in the electoral
process).
195. See supra note 129 (containing the text of Ohio's campaign fraud statutes).
196. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
197. See id. at 1514. Mrs. McIntyre passed out her anonymous literature at a commu-
nity meeting, where her "opponents," the school officials, saw her passing out the flyers.
See id. A school official informed her that the flyers violated the Ohio identification stat-
ute, but she continued to distribute them. See id. Thus, it was easy for the school officials
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and would probably escape prosecution or fines. Thus, if distributing
anonymous campaign literature is constitutionally protected conduct,
candidates and individuals could easily distribute blatantly false, mislead-
ing, and harmful campaign literature attacking their opponents, without
any fear of prosecution. 1
98
Although the McIntyre Court reasoned that banning anonymous cam-
paign literature is not necessary to prevent fraud, 19 9 it is certainly helpful
in the fight against it. As Justice Scalia argued in his dissent, the majority
failed to recognize that a person who is required to put his or her name
on a document is less likely to publish false information than a person
who can publish the false information anonymously, knowing that it is
unlikely that he or she will be caught."' °
to file a complaint against Mrs. McIntyre with the Elections Commission because they
witnessed her actions and could identify her. See id.
198. It is easy to imagine scenarios in which people may abuse their anonymity and
avoid punishment. For example, candidates could have their supporters pass out literature
for them, and, depending on the circumstances, it may be very unlikely that anyone would
recognize that the anonymous flyers were actually distributed by a "representative" of the
candidate. Thus, the candidate may be able to skirt the election fraud laws. Similarly, an
individual distributing fraudulent anonymous flyers might be unknown in the community,
or might pass out the anonymous literature at night in order to avoid detection and recog-
nition. In this situation, unlike that involving Mrs. McIntyre, no one would be able to
establish the identity of the author or the distributor.
This type of situation occurred in State v. Petersilie. 432 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1993). An
unsuccessful candidate anonymously mailed voters derogatory and anti-Semitic literature
about his former opponent, who was then in a run-off election. See id. at 834. The North
Carolina State Bureau of Investigation was unable to identify Mr. Petersilie as the source
until they compared the handwriting on the mailings with Mr. Petersilie's handwriting on
his notice of candidacy. See id. at 835. If Mr. Petersilie had prepared the mailings in a less
personal way, such as by mass-producing computer-generated flyers, his identity would
have been nearly impossible to determine. Instances such as this demonstrate the tremen-
dous difficulty of identifying the authors of anonymous campaign literature.
199. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-22.
200. See id. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 6, at 201 (arguing
that requiring individuals to include their name on campaign literature will deter "smear
attacks").
Commentators have pointed to the relative anonymity of most campaign commercials on
television as a reason for their extreme negativity and deceptive information. See May,
supra note 178, at 190, 192-93. Because federal law requires only a brief identification of
the sponsoring candidate during the broadcast, television advertisements often use "actors,
voice-overs, elaborate set designs, polished imagery, and catchy props" to discredit an op-
ponent. Id. at 192-93. Moreover, because most candidates do not even appear in their
own negative advertisements, they are able to distance themselves from the deceptive and
negative attack and conceal their role as sponsor. See id. at 193; see also supra note 192
(discussing the detrimental effect of negative campaign commercials that appear to be
anonymous). Thus, there is a strong link between anonymity, or relative anonymity, and
deceptive, negative advertisements. See May, supra note 178, at 190, 192-93. This reason-
ing may be logically extended to anonymous campaign literature, as well.
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Additionally, the identification requirement makes it easier for the
State to prosecute violators of the election fraud laws.2 ' It also assists
candidates running for office, who are the subject of libelous campaign
literature, in identifying the sponsoring individual or organization for
201. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In its Brief to the Supreme
Court, the State of Ohio argued:
Ohio's election laws emphasize the deterrence of fraud and corruption and the
disclosure of limited information that is important to assuring an educated and
informed electorate. The Disclosure Statute stands as an integral part of this reg-
ulatory scheme.
The Disclosure Statute performs the important function of identifying the spon-
sor of printed campaign literature. If it were to be repealed or otherwise invali-
dated, the effectiveness of two other important provisions of Ohio elections law
designed to deter fraud would be undermined. These provisions prohibit persons
from making knowingly false statements during the course of candidate elections,
and during the course of issue elections.
In order to commence prosecution for a violation of either statute, a complaint
in the form of an affidavit must be filed alleging violations of the provisions. In
the absence of any requirement of attribution or disclosure, it often may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to identify the source of a false statement, particularly if
any deliberate effort is made to avoid detection. And without accurate identifica-
tion of the prevaricator, it is unlikely that anyone will have a sufficient basis to file
an affidavit charging such violations. These provisions of Ohio's election laws,
therefore, will consist more of "bark" than "bite."
Brief of Respondent at 11-12, McIntyre (No. 93-986) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3599.09.1(B)-(C), 3599.09.2(B)-(C) (Anderson 1988) (current versions at OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 3517.21(B)-(C), 3517.22(B)-(C) (Anderson 1996))) (citations omitted).
An example from the 1996 Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire presidential primary il-
lustrates the enforcement link between disclosure statutes and prohibitions on false state-
ments in campaigns. While campaigning in Iowa on February 1, 1996, staff members of the
"Forbes For President" campaign learned that individuals were distributing anonymous
leaflets critical of candidate Forbes. Telephone Interview with James T. Riley, Esq., Dep-
uty General Counsel, Forbes For President (Feb. 8, 1996). The Forbes campaign officials
immediately noticed that the leaflets contained no disclaimer indicating whether they had
been paid for by a particular candidate, or by an individual on behalf of a candidate. See
id. Although attorneys for the Forbes campaign sought to file a complaint with the Federal
Elections Commission based on this alleged violation of federal law, they were unable to
do so because they did not know who was responsible for the the flyer and, thus, did not
know whom to file a complaint against. See id.
Several days later, on February 3, 1996, the same flyer was distributed in New Hamp-
shire. See id. This time, however, the individuals distributing the flyer were identified by
direct observation as representatives of the "Dole For President" campaign. See id.;
Forbes Grilled over Tough TV Ads, supra note 181, at 2. After learning who was responsi-
ble for the leaflet, attorneys for the Forbes campaign drafted a complaint against the Dole
campaign, which they intended to file with the Federal Elections Commission. See Tele-
phone Interview with James T. Riley, supra. Although this example concerns disclaimers
related to campaign contributions and expenditures under federal election law, a topic
beyond the scope of this Note, the example is relevant to state disclosure statutes and
prohibitions on false statements in campaign literature because it illustrates the difficulty in
identifying the responsible party for purposes of prosecution.
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purposes of a libel suit.2"2 Even public officials, who are unlikely to pre-
vail in a libel suit under the burden of proof established in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,23 benefit from the identification requirement be-
cause it facilitates government prosecution.20 4
Finally, the Court underestimated the strength of Ohio's interest in an
informed electorate 20 5 and dismissed Buckley's recognition of that inter-
est without adequate consideration. 20 6 Although, as the Court noted, the
Buckley decision concerned financial contributions to candidates, rather
than independent leafletting, a similar rationale for disclosure should also
be applied to campaign literature.20 7 Moreover, as Justice Scalia ex-
202. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 201
(discussing the impact of nondisclosure on the ability to prosecute violators of election
fraud statutes).
203. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). To succeed in a libel suit, public officials must show that the
offending statement was made with "actual malice," described as knowledge that the state-
ment was false, or reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 279-80; cf O'NEIL, supra note 129,
at 579 (noting that the "actual malice" standard has caused a decrease in the number of
successful libel suits by public officials and candidates).
204. If a public official is unable to show that a statement was made with "actual mal-
ice," her only recourse for protection from falsehoods might be the election fraud laws
prohibiting false statements in campaign literature. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.21 (Anderson 1996). These laws cannot be enforced effectively unless the identity
of the author or distributor of the false literature is known. A ban on anonymous cam-
paign literature would provide that mechanism. See supra note 201 (discussing the benefit
of disclosure statutes in identifying those responsible for fraudulent campaign literature);
cf O'NEIL, supra note 129, at 579 (explaining that libel suits are not effective remedies for
fraudulent campaign literature).
205. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519-20; see also supra text accompanying notes 125-27
(setting forth the Court's rationale for determining that Ohio's interest in providing infor-
mation to the electorate was insufficient to justify its disclosure statute); LEGGANS, supra
note 93, at 689, 692 (arguing that providing information to the electorate is a compelling
state interest).
206. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1523; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per
curiam); see also supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing the McIntyre
Court's treatment of the Buckley decision).
In Buckley, the Supreme Court reasoned that disclosure of the names of campaign con-
tributors provided valuable information that voters could consider when evaluating candi-
dates. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67. Similarly, the Ohio identification statute serves the
State's interest in an informed electorate because it provides voters with the name of the
sponsor of campaign literature and, thus, assists them in making an informed judgment
while voting. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514 n.3; Bans on Anonymous Political Leaflet-
ting, 109 HARV. L. REv. 180, 187-88 (1995).
207. See McIntyre, 115 S, Ct. at 1523. The McIntyre Court noted that Buckley upheld
the disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures because it furthered the state's
interest in preventing corruption. See id. Based on this analysis, the Court argued that the
Buckley rationale did not apply because issue-based elections do not pose the same threat
of corruption as candidate elections. See id. Nevertheless, the State has a compelling in-
terest in preventing corruption in the electoral process itself. See Bans on Anonymous
Political Leafletting, supra note 206, at 187. As one commentator stated, "The danger that
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plained in his dissent, the Ohio statute is actually less intrusive than the
Buckley financial disclosure requirement.2 °8 Although both require-
ments reveal an individual's viewpoint, only the Buckley requirement de-
tails how much money an individual has spent to further a particular
cause and, thus, provides personal information about the individual's fi-
nancial status.2°9 Therefore, despite the Court's characterization of the
Ohio statute as more intrusive than the Buckley disclosure requirement,
the Court arguably struck down an even less intrusive statute.210
B. McIntyre's Attempt to Clarify the Ambiguity of the Prior Law
Until McIntyre, the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the
issue of anonymous campaign literature. Although some of the Court's
earlier decisions were relevant to the issue, there was a noticeable lack of
clarity in the body of prior law, and the Court's rulings gave no clear
indication of whether bans on anonymous campaign literature were con-
stitutional.21' For example, although some cases stressed the value of an-
onymity,21 2 other cases highlighted the state's interest in disclosing
authors' identities. 213 The uncertainty on the Supreme Court level led
lower courts reviewing disclosure statutes to interpret the Supreme
Court's rulings in different ways, which resulted in constitutional stan-
dards that varied from state to state.214 The greatest source of confusion
concerned determining the level of scrutiny appropriate for reviewing dis-
closure statutes.21 5
voters in a referendum might be subject to illicit influence is arguably as real as the danger
of such influence in a candidate election." Id.
208. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, with McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514 n.3; see also
Bans on Anonymous Political Leafletting, supra note 206, at 188-89 (arguing that the Ohio
identification statute is less likely to provoke retaliation than the Buckley contribution
disclosure requirement).
210. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, with McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514 n.3.
211. See Dupree, supra note 90, at 1216 (noting that McIntyre attempted to "navigate
the muddy middle ground between Talley and Buckley"); see also supra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text (noting the ambiguity in the prior law related to anonymous campaign
literature).
212. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-
63 (1958).
213. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92, 792 n.32 (1973); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, 72, 81-82 (1976) (per curiam); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229
U.S. 288, 296-97, 308-10, 312-13 (1913).
214. See supra note 90 (citing numerous state cases interpreting disclosure statutes).
215. Compare Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (using an exacting scrutiny standard to review
state-imposed restrictions on corporate speech), with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433-34 (1992) (applying the ordinary litigation test of Anderson to Hawaii's ban on write-in
voting), and Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (using the ordinary
1997]
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By sifting through the prior decisions, McIntyre clarified the Court's
previous rulings. Although the Court acknowledged that Talley was not
controlling because it concerned a blanket prohibition on all anonymous
handbills, the McIntyre Court nonetheless reaffirmed Talley's recognition
of the value of anonymity and extended its rationale by articulating a
right to anonymous campaign speech in the electoral context.216 More-
over, the Court used precedent to emphasize that some groups in society
require anonymity because of the threat of reprisals by others.217 Thus,
the Court logically extended Constitutional protection precedents to en-
compass statutes banning anonymous campaign literature.218
At the same time, however, the Court diverged from earlier rulings and
distinguished two cases previously used to support disclosure require-
ments.219 By distinguishing Buckley and Bellotti, both of which stressed
the value of disclosure requirements,22 ° the Court clearly indicated that
those precedents would apply only to financial disclosure requirements
and corporate speech, not campaign literature.22' Thus, the Court seem-
ingly pulled a strong leg of support out from under states' attempts to
mandate disclosure of authors' names on campaign literature.
McIntyre, however, leaves some questions unanswered. What if Ohio's
disclosure requirement had been narrowly tailored to prevent fraud? In
finding that the Ohio statute was not narrowly tailored to prevent fraud
and libel in the election process, the Court left open the question of con-
stitutionality if it had been so limited, either in the text of the statute, or
litigation test to scrutinize a Connecticut statute requiring voters in a party primary to be
registered members of that party), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)
(articulating and applying an ordinary litigation balancing test to Ohio's early filing dead-
line for independent candidates), and Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (using a
balancing test to examine a California statute regulating access to the ballot by independ-
ent candidates), and McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-09 (1969)
(using a lower level of judicial scrutiny to examine an Illinois statute which omitted prison-
ers from the list of people eligible to vote by absentee ballot).
216. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516-24 (1995); see also
Richard K. Norton, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: Defining the Right to
Engage in Anonymous Political Speech, 74 N.C. L. REV. 553,565 (1996) (noting McIntyre's
use of the Talley reasoning to evaluate the Ohio statute); supra text accompanying note
111 (noting that neither the statute in McIntyre, nor the ordinance in Talley, was limited to
the purpose of preventing fraud in the electoral process).
The McIntyre Court also elaborated on the First Amendment protections offered to
anonymous speech and extensively discussed the value of anonymous speech to individuals
and to the society at large. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516-18.
217. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524; Bates, 361 U.S. at 523-24; Patterson, 357 U.S. at
462-63.
218. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524.
219. See id. at 1522-24.
220. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.13; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
221. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522-24.
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in the legislative history.222 Perhaps the fatal flaw of the Ohio statute was
its failure to describe its purpose as a fraud-prevention law that was in-
tended to work in conjunction with the other election fraud provisions of
the Ohio Election Code.22 3 Alternatively, the Court's heavy reliance on
the overbreadth rationale suggests that an identification requirement in-
deed would be constitutional if it mandated disclosure only for fraudulent
or false campaign literature and did not sweep within its grasp truthful
and well-founded political advocacy.224
C. Predictions for the Future: McIntyre's Legacy
Because some of the Court's language in McIntyre is unclear, and the
decision leaves unanswered questions, McIntyre's future impact is diffi-
cult to predict.225 Highlighting this uncertainty, Justice Scalia criticized
the majority for failing to establish a clear rule of law. 226 He noted that
the Court merely signaled that" 'a State's enforcement interest might jus-
tify a more limited identification requirement,' ,227 without further clari-
222. See id. at 1520-22; see supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (discussing Justice
Ginsburg's acknowledgment that the State's interest might justify some sort of identifica-
tion requirement in "other, larger circumstances").
223. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-22.
224. See King, supra note 6, at 154 (noting that under Talley's "overbreadth" reasoning,
a more narrowly drawn statute might have been sustained).
225. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522 ("We recognize that a State's enforcement interest
might justify a more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for
inhibiting the leafletting at issue here.") (emphasis added).
Political analyst David S. Broder argued that McIntyre will "screw up the political pro-
cess in this country." David S. Broder, Bungled By the High Court, WASH. POST, May 7,
1995, at C7. He noted that although the Court "deliberately left in doubt whether the
same ruling would apply if 10,000 or 1 million letters were mailed anonymously on the eve
of a national political election," many campaign operatives are afraid of the decision's
potential impact. Id. For example, Ralph Murphine, the president of the American Asso-
ciation of Political Consultants, stated, " 'When everybody is talking about the need for
civil discourse, not inflammatory rhetoric, here the court says you cannot only say
whatever you want, but you can do it anonymously. I'm a real First Amendment man, but
I think they have opened Pandora's box.' " Id. Hal Malchow, another political strategist,
commented, " 'I find it a terrifying prospect. I think there will be a great temptation for
individuals and organizations to distort and twist the truth, even beyond what takes place
in campaigns today, and to do it with little or no accountability.' " Id. Broder emphasized
the continual rise in negative campaigning and predicted that individuals and groups will
attempt to test the limits of McIntyre, leading to an increase in anonymous campaign mail-
ings. See id.
226. See id. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (quoting the majority opinion in McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522); see also Valerie
M. Sercovich, Casenote, State v. Moses: Louisiana's Prohibition on Anonymous Campaign
Literature-Protecting the Electoral Process or the Politicians?, 41 Loy. L. REV. 559, 576
(1995) (arguing that, based on McIntyre's ambiguity, the Louisiana state legislature will
once again revise their identification statute and attempt "to side-step the mandates of the
courts in an effort to maintain the protection the statute extends to political candidates");
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fying its statement.228 Continuing, Justice Scalia posited that it was
impossible to know whether McIntyre invalidated other existing identifi-
cation statutes and concluded that it would take decades to flesh out the
scope of the right to distribute anonymous campaign literature.229
Because identification statutes exist in nearly every state,23° McIntyre
has the potential to have a far-reaching impact, not only on the laws of
many states, but also on the overall issue of campaign reform.231 Clearly,
supra note 191 (quoting Louisiana's former identification statute and noting its amend-
ment after McIntyre).
228. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. See id.; see also S. Douglas Dodd, Commentary on Free Speech, Pamphleteering
and Politics, 31 TULSA L.J. 503, 507 (1996) (stating that McIntyre will affect every state that
has a disclosure statute and predicting that the Oklahoma statute "will probably have diffi-
culty standing as a result"); Anonymous Electioneering, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1995, at A18
(agreeing with Justice Scalia's prediction that the McIntyre decision will lead to "decades
of litigation testing this ruling"); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Unsigned Political Fli-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A20 (noting that McIntyre is likely to initiate a series of
challenges to state and federal disclosure statutes).
The State of Ohio already has responded to the McIntyre decision. See John Matuszak,
Bill Would Allow Anonymous Political Material, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), June 7, 1995,
at 5-B. Secretary of State Bob Taft and Attorney General Betty Montgomery have pro-
posed legislation which would preserve the right of individuals to distribute anonymous
campaign literature. See id. The bill, however, would also make it a fifth degree felony for
a person to make anonymous false statements in a campaign and a fourth degree felony to
do so within seven days of an election. See id.
The Virginia disclosure statute formerly required all writings concerning a candidate or a
ballot issue to identify the person responsible for the writing. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
1014(B) (Michie 1993), amended by 1996 Va. Acts ch. 1042. After the McIntyre decision,
the Attorney General of Virginia noted that the statute's provision requiring identification
of those responsible for literature about candidates would survive constitutional review,
but the provision for disclosure of the identity of people responsible for writings concern-
ing ballot issues would not survive judicial scrutiny. See Claudia T. Salomon, Campaign
and Election Law, 29 U. RIcH. L. REv. 859, 887 n.191 (1995). In a subsequent case con-
struing the Virginia statute, however, a Virginia state court held that the statute was "indis-
tinguishable" from the statute invalidated in McIntyre and could not survive exacting
scrutiny review. See id. at 887-88 (citing Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell,
906 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Va. 1995)).
230. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing the identification statutes of 49
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government and noting that there are
distinctions among them). Despite this ruling, the Virginia disclosure statute remains in
force, but has been amended to apply only to writings concerning a candidate. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-1014(B) (Michie Supp. 1996).
231. See Dupree, supra note 90, at 1229 (recognizing McIntyre's potentially broad im-
pact and arguing that its holding should neither be interpreted nor extended to allow anon-
ymous broadcast communications by political candidates).
Various campaign reform proposals have been made to address, in part, the rise of nega-
tive campaigning and mudslinging. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at 16 (briefly discussing
reform proposals aimed at reducing negative campaign advertisements); HERRNSON, supra
note 177, at 241-59 (providing an overview and analysis of campaign reform proposals).
Reforms such as providing candidates with free or subsidized postage, radio time, or televi-
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the Court's choice of an exacting scrutiny standard will have broad
ramifications because identification statutes will now be reviewed using
the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Yet, it remains to be seen exactly
how the McIntyre decision will impact the laws of states other than Ohio,
which have similar disclosure requirements.232
Nevertheless, McIntyre is likely to have mixed results. On the one
hand, individuals will have greater freedom to express their political opin-
ions through anonymous campaign literature.233 This is an especially im-
portant right for individuals and groups that fear reprisal from others who
disagree with their opinions.234 On the other hand, as the dissent noted,
it will likely become more difficult for states to maintain the integrity of
the electoral process by curbing election fraud and restoring a level of
dignity to campaign debate because identification and prosecution of
those committing electoral fraud will be substantially more difficult. 235
sion time have been proposed to level the playing field among candidates and reduce the
exorbitant costs of political campaigns. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at 16; HERRNSON,
supra note 177, at 247, 249-51. Free or subsidized campaign communications would pro-
vide candidates with better opportunities to explain their positions on issues and to discuss
their policy proposals and political objectives. See HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 249-50.
If candidates were entitled to free or reduced postage for campaign newsletters, they could
provide more detailed information about their candidacy to voters. See id. at 249. Simi-
larly, if candidates had access to free television broadcast time, in segments longer than 30
seconds, they could focus on providing substantive information about their qualifications
and positions on campaign issues, rather than having to resort to negative attacks and
emotional appeals in the brief advertisements they currently sponsor. See id. at 250;
DIONNE, supra note 177, at 16.
Other reform proposals include reviewing the limits on financial contributions to candi-
dates. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at 16; HERRNSON, supra note 177, at 252-54. Some
commentators advocate maintaining the current $1,000 limit on individual contributions
and the $5,000 limit on political action committee (PAC) contributions, but raising the
aggregate limit on individual contributions to adjust for inflation. See HERRNSON, supra
note 177, at 252. Additionally, proposals for public financing of congressional campaigns
have been suggested. See DIONNE, supra note 177, at 16. For more information on the
subject of campaign reform, see Rebecca Arbogast, Political Campaign Advertising and the
First Amendment: A Structural-Functional Analysis of Proposed Reform, 23 AKRON L.
REV. 209 (1989); Archibald Cox, Constitutional Issues in the Regulation of the Financing of
Election Campaigns, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395 (1982); John M. Sylvester, Note, Equalizing
Candidates' Opportunities for Expression, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (1982).
232. See supra note 229 (discussing the legislative and judicial responses of Ohio and
Virginia to the McIntyre decision).
233. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524.
234. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
235. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In McIntyre, the Supreme Court defined the right to distribute anony-
mous campaign literature. The Court ruled that Ohio's interests in
preventing electoral fraud and providing information to voters were in-
sufficient to justify the burdens that the identification statute placed on
citizens' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Court also
hinted that a more limited identification requirement might be justified,
but the lack of clarity in the Court's opinion leaves open the question of
what type of identification requirement would survive judicial scrutiny
after McIntyre. The full impact of McIntyre will not be realized until sim-
ilar identification statutes are tested on a state-by-state basis. In any
event, the Court's decision in McIntyre will hamper the ability of states to
combat fraudulent statements during the election process and, therefore,
may lead to an increase in potentially damaging mudslinging and other
negative campaign tactics. Thus, the freedom to engage in anonymous
campaign-related speech could lead to dangerous consequences for the
American electoral process.
Rachel J. Grabow
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